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APPRAISAL ARBITRAGE AND THE FUTURE  
OF PUBLIC COMPANY M&A 
CHARLES R. KORSMO  
MINOR MYERS

 
ABSTRACT 
In this Article, we demonstrate that the stockholder’s appraisal 
remedy—long-dismissed in corporate law scholarship as useless or 
worse—is in the middle of a renaissance in public company mergers. We 
argue that this surge in appraisal activity promises to benefit public 
shareholders in circumstances where they are most vulnerable.  
We first show a sea change in the use of appraisal in Delaware. 
Relying on our hand-collected data, we document sharp recent increases 
in the incidence of appraisal petitions, in the size of the petitioners’ 
holdings, and in the sophistication of the petitioners targeting public 
deals. These litigants appear to invest in target company stock after the 
announcement of the merger and with the intention of pursuing appraisal. 
In short, this is appraisal arbitrage. There is every reason to believe that 
appraisal now stands as the most potent legal challenge to opportunistic 
mergers.  
We also present evidence showing that these appraisal petitions bear 
strong markers of litigation merit—they are, in other words, targeting the 
right deals. Nevertheless, defense lawyers have recently suggested that 
appraisal arbitrage constitutes some sort of “abuse” of the remedy and 
ought to be stopped. This nascent argument has matters precisely 
backwards.  
This new world of appraisal should be welcomed and indeed 
encouraged. Our analysis reveals that appraisal arbitrage focuses private 
enforcement resources on the transactions that are most likely to deserve 
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on earlier drafts from Barry Adler, Ian Ayres, Quinn Curtis, Brad Davey, Steven Davidoff, George 
Geis, Jeffrey Gordon, Lawrence Hamermesh, J. Travis Laster, John Morley, Adam Pritchard, Roberta 
Romano, and participants at the American Law & Economics Association Annual Meeting, the 
Harvard/Stanford/Yale Junior Faculty Forum, the National Business Law Scholars Conference, the 
Federalist Society Junior Scholars Colloquium, the George Washington C-LEAF Workshop, the 2013 
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scrutiny, and the benefits of this kind of appraisal accrue to minority 
shareholders even when they do not themselves seek appraisal. In this 
way, the threat of appraisal helps to minimize agency costs in the takeover 
setting, thereby decreasing the ex ante cost of raising equity capital and 
improving allocative efficiency in public company mergers and 
acquisitions. We offer some modest reforms designed to enhance the 
operation of the appraisal remedy in Delaware.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Stockholder appraisal is undergoing a profound transformation in 
Delaware. We demonstrate that appraisal activity has grown rapidly over 
the past three years, and this rise in appraisal litigation has been 
accompanied by the appearance of a new breed of appraisal arbitrageur. 
These developments—in stark contrast to other types of stockholder 
litigation—hold out great promise for stockholders and corporate law 
generally.  
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Stockholder appraisal is a unique remedy in corporate law: it allows the 
stockholder to forego the merger consideration and instead file a judicial 
proceeding to determine the “fair value” of the shares.1 We have collected 
data on all appraisal cases in Delaware for the ten-year period from 2004 
to 2013 and present the main results of our study in this Article.
2
 Our 
Article is the first to provide a comprehensive examination of appraisal 
litigation. The lack of prior work no doubt stems from the prevailing 
academic view that appraisal “is seldom utilized”3 and that the hurdles 
involved make it too cumbersome for stockholders to call upon 
profitably.
4
 These dismissive attitudes towards appraisal are consistent 
with prior research finding that the appraisal remedy is not economically 
significant.
5
  
With this Article, we show that this view is now badly out of date. 
Appraisal activity involving public companies is undergoing explosive 
growth in Delaware, driven by sophisticated parties who specialize in 
bringing appraisal claims. The value of claims in appraisal in 2013 was 
nearly $1.5 billion, a tenfold increase from 2004 and nearly one percent of 
the equity value of all merger activity in 2013.
6
 Furthermore, the 
institutions bringing these claims are not the Potemkin “institutions” that 
often appear in securities or derivative litigation.
7
 Appraisal claims are 
being brought by sophisticated entities that appear to have developed 
specialized investment strategies based on appraisal. This type of investing 
has come to be known as appraisal arbitrage and has utterly transformed 
what may once have been accurately characterized as a sleepy corporate 
law backwater. 
While we can offer no perfect explanation for the rise in appraisal 
arbitrage, we can confidently dismiss two possible explanations that have 
been suggested.
8
 The first ties the increase in appraisal to In re Appraisal 
 
 
 1. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (2015). 
 2. Our focus is on Delaware because it is the most influential corporate law jurisdiction, home 
to more than half of all publicly traded companies in the United States and nearly two-thirds of the 
Fortune 500. 
 3. 2 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, 282 introductory note (1995).  
 4. E.g., COX, HAZEN & O’NEAL, CORPORATIONS 595–96 (1997). (“[Appraisal] is rarely the 
remedy of other than the ‘wine and cheese’ crowd, for seldom is appraisal sought by investors whose 
holdings are less than $100,000.”).  
 5. Paul Mahoney and Mark Weinstein found no evidence that the availability of appraisal is 
associated with higher merger premiums for target shareholders. Paul G. Mahoney & Mark Weinstein, 
The Appraisal Remedy and Merger Premiums, 1 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 239, 242 (1999).  
 6. See infra Part II.A. 
 7. See infra note 91 and accompanying text. 
 8. See infra notes 96–104 and accompanying text. 
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of Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc., a 2007 Chancery Court decision.
9
 
Transkaryotic expanded the time frame for purchasing appraisal-eligible 
stock in advance of a stockholder vote to approve a merger. But the 
judicial ruling itself likely contributed little, if at all, to the rise in appraisal 
arbitrage. Transkaryotic only marginally expanded the time available to 
arbitrageurs for evaluating appraisal claims and, more importantly, only 
affected a subset of merger transactions. Thus, the larger trend is unlikely 
to be the result of the Transkaryotic holding. Likewise, a new statutory 
interest rate available to appraisal petitioners (the federal funds rate plus 
five percent) is unlikely to have been the catalyst for the appraisal boom.
10
 
Given the risks an appraisal petitioner must assume—an extended period 
of illiquidity with an unsecured claim against a surviving company that 
may be highly leveraged, plus the risk of the legal claim itself—the idea 
that interest rates are driving sophisticated parties to target appraisal is 
implausible.  
Whatever its cause, the surge in appraisal litigation implicates a host of 
important public policy questions. The increased activity coincides with a 
rise in stockholder fiduciary litigation generally.
11
 By many accounts, that 
fiduciary litigation is a hotbed of nuisance claims of dubious social 
value.
12
 Accordingly, it is natural to fear that the increase in appraisal 
arbitrage is an ominous development. Appraisal litigation, however, is 
structured in a way that renders the risks of meritless, attorney-driven 
litigation remote.  
In particular, two unique features distinguish appraisal.
13
 First, 
appraisal claims can be purchased: a stockholder need not own the stock 
on the date the challenged merger is announced.
14
 This feature stands in 
contrast to a standard stockholder claim, where the only stockholders who 
may press a claim are those who owned the stock at the time of the alleged 
wrong.
15
 Second, there is no conventional class action: a stockholder is 
 
 
 9. 2007 WL 1378345 (Del. Ch. 2007). 
 10. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (“Unless the Court in its discretion determines otherwise 
for good cause shown, interest from the effective date of the merger through the date of payment of the 
judgment shall be compounded quarterly and shall accrue at 5% over the Federal Reserve discount rate 
. . . .”). 
 11. See Matthew D. Cain & Steven Davidoff Solomon, A Great Game: The Dynamics of State 
Competition and Litigation, 100 IOWA L. REV. 465 (2015) (documenting the rising incidence of 
merger class actions). 
 12. See infra note 117. 
 13. See infra Part III.A. 
 14. See In re Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc., 954 A.2d 346, 368 (Del. Ch. 2008). 
 15. See Charles Korsmo & Minor Myers, The Structure of Stockholder Litigation: When Do the 
Merits Matter?, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 829, 892–93 (2014). 
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only eligible to file an appraisal petition if she affirmatively opts-in by 
meeting certain procedural requirements.
16
 The result is a form of 
aggregate litigation where the aggregation is performed, and the litigation 
controlled, by the actual plaintiff—the appraisal arbitrageur—rather than 
the plaintiffs’ attorney. Indeed, some of the largest appraisal petitioners 
appear to shun contingency arrangements altogether and instead pay their 
attorneys by the hour. In addition, the narrow focus of an appraisal claim 
and the possibility a court will determine fair value to be below the merger 
price render the risks and costs of litigation far more symmetric than in 
other forms of shareholder suit, further reducing the potential for nuisance 
claims.  
We test these propositions empirically and show that appraisal suits 
indeed bear multiple indicia of litigation merit.
17
 The analysis presented 
below reveals that appraisal petitioners target transactions with lower deal 
premia and also going-private transactions, where minority shareholders 
are most likely to face expropriation. By contrast, the size of the 
transaction—believed to correlate more with the size of the potential 
nuisance settlement and long the chief determinant of fiduciary 
litigation—does not appear to matter at all for appraisal petitioners.18 We 
present summary results on these points here and report these findings 
more fully in a companion paper.
19
  
In light of these empirical findings, we argue here that the rise of 
appraisal arbitrage is, on balance, a beneficial development.
20
 Much as the 
market for corporate control generates a disciplining effect on 
management, a robust market for appraisal arbitrage could serve as an 
effective back-end check on expropriation from stockholders in merger 
transactions. The implications in related-party mergers are plain: appraisal 
can protect minority holders against opportunism at the hands of 
controlling stockholders. And in third-party transactions, appraisal can 
serve as a bulwark against sloth, negligence, or unconscious bias in the 
sales process. For appraisal to perform such a role, however, a deep and 
active appraisal arbitrage market is necessary.
21
 By buying up large 
positions after the announcement of a transaction, arbitrageurs can 
overcome the collective action problems that would otherwise render 
 
 
 16. See infra note 56. 
 17. See infra Part III.B. 
 18. See Korsmo & Myers, supra note 15, at 882–84.  
 19. Id.  
 20. See infra Part IV. 
 21. See infra Part IV. 
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appraisal ineffective. At bottom, appraisal arbitrage solves the same 
collective action problems that class action and other aggregate litigation 
seeks to solve, but without generating a serious agency problem in the 
process. 
A highly developed appraisal arbitrage market would aid minority 
shareholders—even those not equipped to pursue appraisal themselves—
by deterring abusive mergers and by causing shares traded post-
announcement to be bid up to the expected value of an appraisal claim.
22
 
Such a result would benefit not only minority shareholders, but also—in 
the long run—controlling shareholders, entrepreneurs, and the economy at 
large. If appraisal arbitrage reduces the risk of expropriation faced by 
minority shareholders, it will increase the value of minority stakes and 
thus reduce the costs of capital for companies and increase the allocative 
efficiency of capital markets as a whole.
23
 
In spite of our empirical findings that appraisal activity is associated 
with merit, and the benefits we argue will be generated by increased 
appraisal arbitrage, defendants have already begun to argue that appraisal 
arbitrage constitutes an abuse of the appraisal process.
24
 This may be, in 
part, an attempt to re-litigate the point in Transkaryotic and foreclose any 
shares acquired after the voting record date from seeking appraisal. More 
generally, this may be the opening salvo in an attempt to curtail appraisal 
rights by altering the substantive standard in appraisal proceedings. We 
believe that either would be a regrettable misstep for Delaware law. One 
of the great virtues of appraisal litigation is that its substantive standard 
defies manipulation and cannot be evaded or altered by purely procedural 
means such as the formation of a committee or inclusion of a particular 
voting provision in a merger agreement.
25
 We show here that the choice to 
initiate appraisal proceedings appears strongly focused on litigation merit. 
It would be a cruel irony if appraisal litigation—where the evidence 
suggests that the merits matter—were to be “reformed” by importing 
features of fiduciary merger litigation, where the evidence suggests the 
 
 
 22. See infra Part IV. 
 23. See infra note 160. 
 24. See In re Appraisal of Dole Food Co., No. 9079-VCL, Letter to J. Travis Laster from Bruce 
L. Silverstein, Dec. 27, 2013, at 3 (“These appraisal actions are being pursued by ‘appraisal 
arbitrageurs,’ who [sic] Dole understands to have acquired all or substantially all of their shares 
following the public announcement of the transaction—including many shares acquired after the 
record date for the vote on the merger, and some shares acquired even after the merger was approved 
by public stockholders. Dole respectfully submits that this is an abuse of the appraisal process . . . .”).  
 25. See In re MFW S’holders Litig., 67 A.3d 496 (Del. Ch. 2013). 
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legal merits are functionally irrelevant.
26
 Indeed, the more promising 
direction of reform is the reverse: borrowing features from appraisal and 
applying them to other forms of shareholder litigation. We offer some 
tentative thoughts on potential reforms along these lines.
27
 
This is not to suggest that the appraisal remedy, as currently 
constituted, could not be improved. Indeed, the basic premise of 
appraisal—that a judicial proceeding can provide a more reliable valuation 
of stock than some market process—fails in predicable circumstances. In 
our view, a genuine market test of the target company will necessarily 
provide a superior valuation of the stockholders’ interest, and in such 
circumstances an appraisal proceeding can only cause mischief. For this 
reason, we would support the development of a safe harbor to eliminate 
appraisal where the transaction has undergone a true auction. A target 
could affirmatively seek the protection of the safe harbor only by 
subjecting itself to a genuine market test, not merely by engaging in a 
procedural kabuki dance that happens to satisfy Revlon.
28
 Our second 
reform proposal focuses on decoupling appraisal rights from the form of 
merger consideration. Delaware currently limits the availability of 
appraisal to mergers where the consideration takes certain forms—
primarily cash or non-public shares. We argue that the form of merger 
consideration should be irrelevant to eligibility for appraisal. The 
adequacy of the consideration paid in a merger does not, at the end of the 
day, depend on the form of that consideration. Our two reform proposals 
together would improve the functioning of appraisal arbitrage as a 
mechanism of corporate governance. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides a brief summary of the 
structure of appraisal litigation and prior scholarly perspectives. Part II 
presents the results of our empirical investigation of appraisal activity, 
showing since 2011 a large increase in activity and the emergence of 
appraisal arbitrageurs. Part III demonstrates that the merits appear to 
matter in the decision to file appraisal petitions. Part IV argues that, in 
light of these empirical findings, appraisal arbitrage has the potential to 
play a beneficial role in corporate governance. Part V suggests reforms for 
appraisal and for fiduciary litigation.  
 
 
 26. See Korsmo & Myers, supra note 15, at 870–78 
 27. See infra at Part V. 
 28. See Barkan v. Amsted Indus., 567 A.2d 1279 (Del. 1989).  
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I. THE ROLE OF APPRAISAL IN CORPORATE LAW 
Appraisal allows a stockholder to dissent from a merger and forego the 
merger consideration in favor of filing a judicial proceeding that will 
determine the “fair value” of the stock cancelled in the merger.29 This Part 
describes the design of modern appraisal statutes in Delaware and 
elsewhere and also outlines the overwhelmingly pessimistic view of 
appraisal in prior legal scholarship.  
A. The Statutory Design of Appraisal 
The origin of the modern appraisal action can be traced back to basic 
changes in American corporate law at the beginning of the twentieth 
century.
30
 Older corporate codes required the unanimous consent of all 
shareholders before a merger or other fundamental change.
31
 The holdout 
problem—a single shareholder could stand in the way of any significant 
transaction—became severe as companies increasingly tapped public 
equity markets.
32
 In response, states amended their corporate codes to 
eliminate the requirement of unanimity and replace it with a majority-
voting rule.
33
 This change stripped minority shareholders of protection 
against majority expropriation, and the appraisal remedy emerged as 
something of a replacement.
34
 Appraisal affords minority shareholders 
 
 
 29. See generally DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (2015); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 13.02 (2008). 
In this paper, we focus on mergers involving Delaware entities and will therefore largely limit the 
discussion to Delaware law. 
 30. While some form of appraisal rights existed in a few jurisdictions as long ago as the middle 
of the nineteenth century, they only became available widely in their modern form in the early 
twentieth century. See MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION: A LEGAL 
ANALYSIS § 7.1, at 75 (1976). 
 31. See Robert B. Thompson, Exit, Liquidity, and Majority Rule: Appraisal’s Role in Corporate 
Law, 84 GEO. L.J. 1, 11–14 (1995); Barry M. Wertheimer, The Shareholders’ Appraisal Remedy and 
How Courts Determine Fair Value, 47 DUKE L.J. 613, 618–19 (1998). 
 32. See William J. Carney, Fundamental Corporate Changes, Minority Shareholders, and 
Business Purposes, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 69, 81 (“It became increasingly apparent to observers 
that great benefits to society, to the corporation, and derivatively to the rest of the shareholders were 
sometimes blocked to protect interests that seemed quite minor . . . to the remaining shareholders and 
perhaps to most outsiders.”); Thompson, supra note 31, at 12–13. 
 33. See Carney, supra note 32, at 94 (“Over the first third of the twentieth century the pattern of 
allowing fundamental changes in all corporations to take place on something less than a unanimous 
shareholder vote became the norm . . . .”). 
 34. See, e.g., George S. Geis, An Appraisal Puzzle, 105 NW. L. REV. 1635, 1642 (2011) 
(“[Appraisal] mushroomed in the early 1900s, when state lawmakers granted appraisal rights to 
shareholders—apparently in exchange for an easing of merger voting requirements.”) (footnote 
omitted); Thompson, supra note 31, at 14 (“Appraisal statutes are often presented as having been 
enacted in tandem with statutes authorizing consolidation or merger by less than unanimous vote 
. . . .”); Joseph L. Weiner, Payment of Dissenting Stockholders, 27 COLUM. L. REV. 547, 547–48 & n.7 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss6/7
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who object to a fundamental transaction the opportunity to exit from the 
enterprise on terms set by a judge instead of majority shareholders.
35
  
The availability of appraisal rights varies from jurisdiction to 
jurisdiction. In MBCA states, appraisal rights are available in a wide array 
of circumstances, including a merger, a sale of assets, or an amendment to 
the certificate of incorporation.
36
 In Delaware, by contrast, only mergers 
give rise to appraisal rights.
37
 For public companies, the form of 
consideration also affects eligibility for appraisal. The remedy is available 
if cash is the merger consideration but not if shareholders receive stock in 
the surviving entity or in another widely traded entity—the so-called 
“market out” exception.38 Even when a transaction gives rise to appraisal 
rights, stockholders must affirmatively comply with a number of 
requirements to be eligible to pursue the remedy. For example, the 
stockholder must not vote in favor of the merger,
39
 must deliver to the 
company a written demand of appraisal rights,
40
 and must file a petition in 
the Court of Chancery within 120 days of the merger’s effective date.41   
 
 
(1927) (listing states enacting an appraisal remedy in the early twentieth century); Wertheimer, supra 
note 31, at 614 (“The origin of the appraisal remedy typically is tied to the move in corporate law . . . 
away from a requirement of unanimous shareholder consent.”). But see Mahoney & Weinstein, supra 
note 5, at 243 (questioning whether appraisal statutes were a direct reaction to elimination of 
unanimity requirements). 
 35. See Geis, supra note 34, at 1643 (“[A]ppraisal rights were therefore enacted in most 
jurisdictions as an emergency exit from majority rule. A merger could move forward with less-than-
unanimous approvals, but minority owners had an escape if they disliked the shift in direction.”); 
Thompson, supra note 31, at 26. In this respect—as in others—appraisal is a highly unusual remedy in 
corporate law. Shareholders do not, under normal circumstances, have the power to withdraw their 
proportional interest from the firm’s assets. See In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 37 (Del. 
Ch. 2013) (“Equity capital, by default, is permanent capital.”); Margaret M. Blair, Locking in Capital: 
What Corporate Law Achieved for Business Organizers in the Nineteenth Century, 51 UCLA L. REV. 
387 (2003); Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 110 
YALE L.J. 387 (2000). Usually, the only “exit” for disgruntled shareholders is to sell their shares in a 
secondary market. But appraisal is an instance where a shareholder may, in effect, withdraw their 
interest in the firm other than via market exit. 
 36. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 13.02(a)(3).  
 37. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (2015). 
 38. See id. § 262(b). 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. § 262(d)(1). Such a demand is usually simply a short statement informing the issuer of the 
number of shares held and the intent to seek appraisal. 
 41. Id. § 262(e). A shareholder that makes demand need not ultimately file a petition for 
appraisal, and retains the right to back out and take the merger consideration within sixty days of the 
effective date of the merger. Id. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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B. The Critique of Appraisal  
Appraisal has long been regarded in the corporate law literature as an 
almost useless remedy. Scholarly commentators throughout the 1960s and 
1970s heaped scorn on it. Bayless Manning issued perhaps the most well-
known indictment in a 1962 Yale Law Journal piece, describing appraisal 
as “of virtually no economic advantage to the usual shareholder except in 
highly specialized situations.”42 Similarly, Victor Brudney and Marvin 
Chirelstein called it a “last-ditch check on management improvidence,”43 
and Melvin A. Eisenberg described it as a “remedy of desperation.”44 Part 
of the reason these commentators found appraisal so pointless is that 
transactions can often be structured to avoid it. At a Delaware firm, for 
example, a sale of all assets would have the same economic effect as a 
merger but, unlike a merger, would not give rise to appraisal rights.  
Academic commentary continues to take a sweepingly dismissive view 
of appraisal.
45
 The modern critique faults appraisal because, as one 
Delaware court noted, it is “chock-full of disadvantages for 
shareholders.”46 These disadvantages tend to fall into three categories: 
 
 
 42. Bayless Manning, The Shareholder’s Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for Frank Coker, 72 
YALE L.J. 223, 260 (1962) (“The appraisal remedy is of virtually no economic advantage to the usual 
shareholder except in highly specialized situations.”).  
 43. Victor Brudney & Marvin A. Chirelstein, Fair Shares in Corporate Mergers and Takeovers, 
88 HARV. L. REV. 297, 304 (1974).  
 44. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Legal Roles of Shareholders and Management in Modern 
Corporate Decisionmaking, 57 CAL. L. REV. 1, 85 (1969).  
 45. E.g., Bradley R. Aronstam, R. Franklin Balotti & Timo Rehbock, Delaware’s Going-Private 
Dilemma: Fostering Protections for Minority Shareholders in the Wake of Siliconix and Unocal 
Exploration, 58 BUS. LAW. 519, 546 (2003) (“[I]n practice, the appraisal remedy is replete with 
shortcomings and therefore fails to protect adequately minority shareholders from majoritarian 
abuse.”); John C. Coffee, Jr., Transfers of Control and the Quest for Efficiency: Can Delaware Law 
Encourage Efficient Transactions While Chilling Inefficient Ones?, 21 DEL. J. CORP. L. 359, 412 
(1996) (“Standing alone, the appraisal remedy cannot begin to assure the receipt of proportionate 
value.”); Jesse Fried & Mira Ganor, Agency Costs of Venture Capitalist Control in Startups, 81 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 967, 1005 (2006) (“The shortcomings of the appraisal remedy are widely known. 
Commentators have long recognized that appraisal is a remedy that few shareholders will seek under 
any circumstance.”) (footnote omitted); Joel Seligman, Reappraising the Appraisal Remedy, 52 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 829, 830 (1984) (arguing that appraisal suffers from “substantial defects in the ability 
of state corporate law to ensure dissenting shareholders the fair value of their shares.”); Guhan 
Subramanian, Fixing Freezeouts, 115 YALE L.J. 2, 31 (2005) (“[I]t is well accepted among academic 
commentators and practitioners that appraisal is a weak remedy compared to entire fairness review.”). 
See also COX, HAZEN & O’NEAL, supra note 4, at 601 (“[T]he risk of considerable expense as well as 
the procedural difficulties in pursuing the [appraisal] remedy further decrease its effectiveness in 
protecting minority shareholders.”); 2 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 2, at 282 
(“The practical utility of the appraisal remedy as a protection for minority shareholders has been the 
subject of much debate, and few legal commentators have been confident that the remedy works 
sufficiently well to play a major role in corporate governance.”). 
 46. Turner v. Bernstein, 776 A.2d 530, 547 (Del. Ch. 2000). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss6/7
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(1) the procedural burdens of preserving and asserting an appraisal 
remedy; (2) the inability to proceed as a class and shift attorneys’ fees to 
shareholders as a whole or to defendants; and (3) the narrow and inflexible 
nature of the remedy available. Taken together, these disadvantages have 
led many scholars to believe that appraisal will almost never prove useful. 
The literature is replete with references to the supposedly Byzantine 
procedure for asserting one’s appraisal rights. Leading casebooks refer to 
appraisal as “a cumbersome remedy,”47 and one that requires shareholders 
of Delaware corporations to navigate a “complicated maze . . . to 
successfully assert appraisal rights.”48 Others have suggested that 
“[a]ppraisal litigation is complicated and expensive” and that “many 
shareholders find it difficult to meet the complicated procedural 
requirements and deadlines of the appraisal remedy.”49 On top of the 
supposed complexity, a shareholder bringing an appraisal action in 
Delaware is required to forego the merger consideration, and thus may not 
finance the litigation out of the merger proceeds, such that they “may 
receive no return on their investment for prolonged periods of time.”50 
Indeed, courts in appraisal actions can, and occasionally do,
51
 determine 
fair value of the plaintiff’s shares to be less than the merger 
consideration.
52
 In contrast, fiduciary duty class action plaintiffs have 
typically already received the merger consideration and face no financial 
downside, giving fiduciary litigation an option value that is absent in 
appraisal actions.
53
 
Perhaps the main reason given for the supposed impotence of the 
appraisal remedy is the inability to proceed as a class.
54
 While 
shareholders not desiring to be represented in a typical stockholder class 
 
 
 47. ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 12.2, at 508 (1986) (“[A]ppraisal is often a 
cumbersome remedy.”). 
 48. PETER V. LETSOU, CORPORATE MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 429 (2006). 
 49. Fried & Ganor, supra note 45, at 1004. 
 50. Mary Siegel, Back to the Future: Appraisal Rights in the Twenty-First Century, 32 HARV. J. 
LEGIS. 79 (1995).  
 51. See infra Part III.A, at n.126. 
 52. See Siegel, supra note 50, at 103 (“[S]hareholders in appraisal actions risk the possibility of 
receiving less than the transaction price.”). 
 53. Id. 
 54. See, e.g., Andra v. Blount, 772 A.2d 183, 192 (Del. Ch. 2000) (noting the “unavailability of a 
class action and fee shifting in appraisal actions”); Turner v. Bernstein, 776 A.2d 530, 548 (Del. Ch. 
2000) (“[T]he unavailability of the class action mechanism in appraisal also acts as a substantial 
disincentive for its use.”); Fried & Ganor, supra note 45, at 1004 n.105 (2006) (“In Delaware, 
shareholders seeking appraisal are barred from using class action suits.”).  
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action must try to opt-out,
55
 shareholders seeking judicial appraisal must 
“opt-in.”56 Moreover, because dissenting shareholders must vote against 
the merger and give notice of intent to pursue appraisal, the process of 
opting-in must actually begin long before the appraisal petition is filed.
57
 
As Ronald Gilson and Jeffrey Gordon note, this procedural difference 
between opt-out fiduciary litigation and opt-in appraisal litigation is 
“ultimately of enormous substantive consequence.”58  
Given the superficial similarity of the issues and remedies involved in a 
fiduciary duty proceeding and in an appraisal action, the availability of 
class treatment in the former potentially makes it far more attractive, at 
least in theory.
59
 The major benefit of class treatment to the plaintiff (or 
her attorney) is that it allows litigation costs to be spread over the 
potentially much larger class of aggrieved minority shareholders.
60
 Some 
 
 
 55. Indeed, this option is not necessarily available in a fiduciary class action. See In re Celera 
Corp. S’holder Litig., 59 A.2d 418, 434–37 (Del. 2012) (describing the limited circumstances where 
stockholder can opt-out of merger class actions certified under Rule 23(b)(2)).  
 56. See, e.g., 2 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 3, at 267 n.6 (“[T]he 
appraisal remedy differs from the procedural rules applicable to the class action, which assume that 
investors who do not ‘opt out’ desire to be represented.”); Aronstam, Balotti, & Rehbock, supra note 
45, at 547 (“[T]he appraisal statute creates an ‘opt-in’ class for minority shareholders as opposed to the 
‘opt-out’ default mechanism of class action lawsuits. Thus, only shareholders specifically electing to 
opt in will be able to benefit from a judicial determination diverging from the corporation’s initial 
valuation.”). 
 57. See Alabama By-Products Corp. v. Cede & Co. ex rel. Shearson Lehman Bros., Inc., 657 
A.2d 254, 260 n.10 (Del. 1995) (“In an appraisal proceeding, however, shareholders enter the appraisal 
class by complying with the statutory formalities required to perfect their appraisal rights. Thus, 
shareholders seeking appraisal ‘opt in’ to a class, invariably before suit is even filed, rather than ‘opt 
out.’”). 
 58. Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, Controlling Controlling Shareholders, 152 U. PA. L. 
REV. 785, 798 (2003). 
 59. Id. at 831–32 (“[A]n entire fairness proceeding . . . provides the equivalent of a class 
appraisal proceeding without the need for shareholders actually to perfect their appraisal rights”).  
 60. Andra v. Blount, 772 A.2d 183, 194 (Del. Ch. 2000) (“In a class action, the plaintiff’s 
lawyers can take their fees and expenses against any class-wide recovery, whereas in an appraisal 
action the fees and expenses can be recovered only as an offset against the appraisal award to the 
usually far smaller group of stockholders who perfected their appraisal rights.”). Elsewhere in its 
opinion, the Andra court notes that in an “entire fairness” proceeding, “the non-tendering stockholder 
may spread her litigation costs over any classwide recovery and may obtain an order requiring the 
defendants to pay her attorneys’ fees, thus making it easier for her to find legal representation and 
enabling her the possibility of a full recovery.” Id. at 184. The court goes on to point out that “[i]f 
relegated to an appraisal action, the non-tendering stockholder will have to cover her attorneys’ fees 
out of any recovery she (and the usually smaller group of appraisal petitioners) obtain and will be 
unable to proceed as a class representative on behalf of all similarly situated stockholders.” Id. See, 
e.g., WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE: LEGAL AND 
ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 215 (9th ed. 2004) (“[T]he appraisal remedy lacks the class action’s ability to 
secure automatic representation and a greater recovery for shareholders.”); Fried & Ganor, supra note 
45, at 1004 n.105 (“In Delaware, shareholders seeking appraisal are barred from using class action 
suits. Because each shareholder must pursue his own individual claim, shareholders lose the important 
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commentators also suggest that the unavailability of attorney fee-shifting 
in most Delaware appraisal actions further increases the relative costs of 
appraisal litigation to the plaintiff.
61
 Fee shifting, however, may be less 
economically significant than it appears at first glance. Even where fee 
shifting is available, any fees must come out of what the defendant would 
otherwise be prepared to offer to settle the case. In most cases, it will make 
little economic difference whether the defendant pays the plaintiffs’ 
attorneys—in which case the defendant will be willing to pay less to settle 
the case—or if the plaintiff pays—in which case it will come out of the 
settlement. In either situation, the plaintiff ends up bearing most or all of 
the economic cost. The more significant difference between a fiduciary 
class action and an appraisal action stems not from the unavailability of 
fee shifting, but rather that a larger class leads to a larger plaintiff group 
and greater leverage to extract a settlement. Plaintiffs’ attorneys in 
fiduciary class actions can bear the up-front costs of bringing a claim,
62
 
 
 
economic benefits of class actions, which spread the costs of litigation and facilitate contingency 
financing.”). 
 61. See, e.g., Andra, 772 A.2d at 194–95 (“Class actions and fee shifting are crucial if litigation 
is to serve as a method of holding corporate fiduciaries accountable to stockholders. Without them, 
collective actions problems would make it economically impractical for many meritorious actions to 
be brought.”); Aronstam, Balotti, & Rehbock, supra note 45, at 546 (“Most problematic is that in 
contrast to the class action model where fees and costs incurred by successful shareholders can be 
shifted to the class or the corporation, the statutory regime for appraisal rights requires individual 
shareholders to foot these costly expenses on their own.”); Subramanian, supra note 45, at 30 
(“[U]nlike plaintiff shareholders in a class action claim for entire fairness, plaintiffs in an appraisal 
proceeding must bear their own costs, including legal fees and the costs of expert witnesses.”).  
 62. Gilson and Black describe the dynamic thusly:  
Most importantly, the [fiduciary duty] suit can be brought as a class action. Minority 
shareholders need take no affirmative action in order to participate, nor need they expend any 
resources to pursue the action. All the responsibility—both for initiating the action and for its 
expenses—is borne by the self-designated lawyer for the class who is compensated, one way 
or the other, out of the amount recovered. The lawyer then stands, in effect, as an independent 
investor who balances his estimate of the potential recovery to all shareholders against the 
cost of the proceeding and the uncertainty associated with its outcome. 
RONALD J. GILSON & BERNARD S. BLACK, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS 
1267 (2d ed. 1995). Similarly, Mary Siegel notes:  
Just as shareholders have financial incentives to pursue non-appraisal actions, plaintiffs’ 
attorneys are similarly motivated by the size of potential fees. While most jurisdictions 
provide that attorneys’ fees in appraisal awards may be apportioned from the recovery, as are 
fees in class actions, these equivalent structures often do not produce equivalent results. The 
potential amount of the attorneys’ fees—and therefore their willingness to undertake a 
matter—is directly linked to the number of shares in the plaintiff class. In appraisal 
proceedings, the class tends to be small. In contrast, the representative nature of a class action 
does not require any action by individual shareholders, except for those shareholders desiring 
to ‘opt out’ of the class. Ease of formation, coupled with a lack of financial concerns, tends to 
make the plaintiff group in class actions relatively large. The allocation of attorneys’ fees as a 
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secure in the knowledge that they will be able to settle the claim for at 
least nuisance value. 
Appraisal is potentially even less attractive in view of the narrow scope 
of the remedy available. Plaintiffs in appraisal actions are limited to 
receiving fair value for their shares.
63
 Typically, of course, that is precisely 
the remedy the shareholder wants. Nonetheless, this limited remedy has a 
tactical drawback compared to the otherwise similar fiduciary duty class 
action.
64
 The threat of injunction or rescission—even where it is not really 
what the stockholder is after—can significantly increase the settlement 
leverage of a plaintiff in a fiduciary duty class action.
65
  
With these disadvantages in mind, it is easy to see why so many 
commentators have come to the conclusion that plaintiffs will rarely, if 
ever, choose to pursue an appraisal action instead of a fiduciary duty class 
action. All of the “incentive[s] for plaintiffs [are] to reject the technically 
easier option of an appraisal action for the more onerous burden of 
proving a fiduciary breach.”66 With a fiduciary class action almost always 
 
 
percentage of the recovery of the class, when the process is skewed toward creating a large 
class, may be the pivotal reason for the preference for class actions. 
Siegel, supra note 50, at 103–04. 
 63. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h)–(i); Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 542 A.2d 1182, 
1187 (Del. 1988) (“[I]n a section 262 appraisal action the only litigable issue is the determination of 
the value of the appraisal petitioners’ shares on the date of the merger, the only party defendant is the 
surviving corporation and the only relief available is a judgment against the surviving corporation for 
the fair value of the dissenters’ shares.”); Nagy v. Bistricer, 770 A.2d 43, 55 (Del. Ch. 2000) (“[I]t is 
clear that the sole remedy that will be available in an appraisal proceeding is a fair value award. . . .”). 
 64. See Cede, 542 A.2d at 1187 (“In contrast [to appraisal], a fraud action asserting fair dealing 
and fair price claims affords an expansive remedy and is brought against the alleged wrongdoers to 
provide whatever relief the facts of a particular case may require.”). 
 65. See Siegel, supra note 50, at 104 (1995) (“The ability to seek an injunction or rescissory 
damages significantly strengthens the minority’s bargaining power. As a result, plaintiffs are drawn to 
class actions to air a broader range of grievances.”). The Andra court recognizes this possibility, while 
emphasizing the relatively greater importance of the class size. See Andra, 772 A.2d at 194 (“[T]he 
Litigation–Cost Benefits of a class action that most often makes an unfair dealing claim so much more 
attractive than appraisal from a plaintiff’s perspective, not the theoretical possibility of an award of 
(rarely granted) rescissory damages.”).  
 66. Turner v. Bernstein, 776 A.2d 530, 548 (Del. Ch. 2000). See, e.g., Wertheimer, supra note 
31, at 623 n.52 (“There are numerous economic incentives for shareholders to challenge acquisition 
transactions in class action lawsuits alleging breach of fiduciary duty, rather than in appraisal 
proceedings.”); see Andra, 772 A.2d at 196 (“The substantial procedural advantages of equitable 
actions has naturally led to a strong preference for such actions over the otherwise seemingly attractive 
(from a plaintiff’s perspective) prospect of appraisal actions focused solely on a fair value remedy.”); 
Siegel, supra note 50, at 103 (“For a variety of reasons, shareholders have incentives to pursue class 
actions instead of, or in addition to, their appraisal action.”). 
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available to challenge suspect transactions,
67
 one might simply conclude 
that appraisal is unnecessary and can safely be abandoned.  
Several commentators, however, have suggested that appraisal should 
be reformed, rather than consigned to the scrap heap.
68
 Naturally enough, 
suggestions for reform center on making the appraisal action look more 
like the typical fiduciary duty class action.
69
 Most prominently, a number 
of scholars have suggested extending opt-out class treatment to appraisal 
actions.
70
 
Modifying appraisal to allow opt-out class treatment would, however, 
potentially have substantial downsides, in addition to any upside gained. 
Class treatment would almost certainly expand the practical availability of 
appraisal and could theoretically help address any under-deterrence 
problem. But it would also introduce the same agency-cost dynamics that 
have traditionally bedeviled shareholder litigation. As we explain, the very 
feature of appraisal action that attracts the most criticism—the 
unavailability of class treatment—also has the great virtue of largely 
eliminating the kinds of agency problems that can lead to abusive and 
wasteful shareholder litigation.
71
 Furthermore, the new phenomenon of 
appraisal arbitrage has the potential to solve the same collective action 
 
 
 67. Andra, 772 A.2d at 192 (“[I]t has become nearly impossible for a judge of this court to 
dismiss a well-pled unfair dealing claim on the basis that appraisal is available as a remedy and is fully 
adequate.”). 
 68. See, e.g., GILSON & BLACK, supra note 62, at 1267 (“[E]specially because the absence of a 
class action mechanism makes it impossible for lawyers to act, in effect, as surrogates for minority 
shareholders with respect to whether to invest in an appraisal proceeding, most shareholders will not 
dissent. As a result, many of the minority shares can be purchased for less than what would be the 
‘appraisal’ price.”); KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note 60, at 215 (“[T]hose planning the merger or other 
transaction have an incentive to offer an unfairly low price, even if they expect to be required to pay a 
much higher price to shareholders who seek appraisal, because they anticipate that only a small 
minority of shareholders will do so.”); Siegel, supra note 50, at 104 (footnote omitted) (“Thus, as 
shareholders often choose a non-appraisal remedy, the appraisal remedy today does not provide the 
protection for majority shareholders that Dean Manning envisioned.”).  
 69. See, e.g., KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note 60, at 215 (“[T]he key policy issue about the appraisal 
remedy is the degree to which it should be reformed to resemble the class action and thereby provide 
some form of collective representation that may be elected at low cost.”). 
 70. See, id.; see, e.g., GILSON & BLACK, supra note 62, at 1268 (“[E]ven if the substance of the 
remedy for failing the entire fairness standard did not differ one whit from that which would be 
forthcoming in an appraisal proceeding, the availability of the class action mechanism to enforce a 
violation . . . meant that substantially more shareholders could benefit from it.”); KLEIN & COFFEE, 
supra note 60, at 215 (“[T]he appraisal remedy lacks the class action’s ability to secure automatic 
representation and a greater recovery for shareholders.”); Gilson & Gordon, supra note 58, at 837 
(“[A] class-based appraisal remedy—the equivalent of a Sinclair remedy—is called for regardless of 
the transaction form, and the holding that the Delaware Supreme Court should reconsider is the 
chancery court’s application of Solomon to freeze-out tender offers, rather than Kahn I’s provision of 
class-based appraisal.”).  
 71. See infra note 116. 
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problems addressed by aggregate litigation, while avoiding the agency 
problems that plague class actions. 
A singular feature of appraisal litigation—and one essential to the rise 
of appraisal arbitrage—is that standing to bring an appraisal petition is not 
limited to investors who held stock at the time of the announcement. In 
securities and derivative litigation, standing to bring the claims is limited 
by the so-called contemporaneous ownership requirement.
72
 This means 
that investors who acquire the stock after the alleged wrong may not bring 
suit to remedy it. Appraisal is different in an important way: an investor 
who acquires the stock after the announcement of the merger may still 
pursue appraisal. The cutoff for acquiring stock with appraisal rights 
depends on the structure of the transaction,
73
 but investors generally have 
long enough to examine proxy statements, tender offer statements, or other 
informational material before deciding whether to acquire stock with 
appraisal rights. This means that an investor can accumulate a large stake 
in a company after the announcement of a merger and still pursue 
appraisal rights in court.
74
  
II. THE RISE OF APPRAISAL ARBITRAGE 
Prior examinations of appraisal have largely taken place in an empirical 
vacuum. To remedy this, we have collected all appraisal petitions filed in 
the Delaware Court of Chancery for the ten-year period from the start of 
2004 through the end of 2013. In addition, by examining public filings we 
have collected information on the dissenters and their claims.
75
 The focus 
of our analysis is on appraisal petitions filed against public companies.
76
 
 
 
 72. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 327 (2015) (requiring for derivative suits that “the plaintiff was 
a stockholder of the corporation at the time of the transaction of which such stockholder complains.”). 
While on its terms, Section 327 only applies to derivative suits, a contemporaneous ownership 
requirement has also been imposed in direct actions in the context of lead counsel or lead plaintiff 
selection. See Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 809 A.2d 1163, 1169–70 (Del. Ch. 2002) 
(dismissing fiduciary duty claims because plaintiffs’ shares were purchased after the merger 
announcement); see also J. Travis Laster, Goodbye to the Contemporaneous Ownership Requirement, 
33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 673, 680 n.36 (2008) (noting that Delaware courts “bar direct actions by after-
acquiring shareholders”).  
 73. See infra text accompanying note 99.  
 74. See Merion Capital v. BMC Software, Inc., No. 8900-VCG, 2015 WL 67586, at *1 (Del. Ch. 
Jan. 5, 2015) (holding that petitioner who acquired stock after the announcement of the merger was 
entitled to pursue appraisal); In re Appraisal of Ancestry.com, Inc., No. 8173–VCG, 2015 WL 66825, 
at *1 (Del. Ch. Jan. 5, 2015) (same).  
 75. Our data collection is described more fully in our companion paper. Korsmo & Myers, supra 
note 15.  
 76. We restrict our study to public companies for three reasons. First, the scarcity of data 
regarding private companies renders them less amenable to study. Second, public company mergers 
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We use this data set to provide the first full picture of modern appraisal 
activity.
77
  
Our data reveal Delaware is in the midst of a sea change in appraisal 
litigation. While appraisal may once have been a quiet corner of corporate 
law, it is now an area of active litigation undergoing a period of explosive 
growth. Furthermore, the parties driving that growth are a new group of 
sophisticated investors who appear to specialize in pursuing appraisal 
claims.
78
 In short, we have documented the rise of appraisal arbitrage.  
A. The Surge in Appraisal Activity 
A basic result of our investigation is that appraisal activity involving 
public companies increased substantially starting in 2011, as measured 
both by the number of petitions filed and the value of the dissenting 
shares.  
The most basic way to measure appraisal activity is by the raw counts 
of petitions filed. During our ten-year period of study, 129 appraisal 
petitions were filed in Delaware involving counseled petitioners.
79
 Figure 
1 shows the number of petitions filed per year.   
 
 
and their accompanying appraisal actions are far more economically significant. See Korsmo & Myers, 
supra note 15, at 879–82. Third, the type of appraisal arbitrage we discuss is generally only possible 
for public company mergers. 
 77. Earlier empirical studies of appraisal activity include Randall Thomas, Revising the 
Delaware Appraisal Statute, 3 DEL. L. REV. 1 (2000) (examining appraisal actions filed between 1977 
and 1997), and Randall Thomas & Robert Thompson, The New Look of Shareholder Litigation: 
Acquisition-Oriented Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 133 (2004) (including data on appraisal actions 
from 1999 and 2000). 
 78. By contrast, in a 2007 article, Kahan and Rock observed that hedge funds bringing appraisal 
actions did so primarily as a last resort. Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate 
Governance and Corporate Control, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1021, 1038–39 (2007) (suggesting that 
“[w]hen hedge funds are dissatisfied with the terms of an acquisition and unable to obtain better terms, 
they also resort to litigation” and giving examples including appraisal).  
 79. Seven petitions involved disputes with only pro se petitioners. We exclude them from our 
analysis because they are of little economic significance and are unlikely to reflect any broader pattern.  
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FIGURE 1 
COUNSELED APPRAISAL PETITIONS PER YEAR, 2004–2013 
 
Figure 1 shows the effective year of the underlying transaction, rather 
than the filing year of the petition.
80
 The reason for focusing on the 
transaction year is that a petitioner has 120 days following the effective 
date to file a petition, and the effective date better captures the timing from 
the perspective of the appraisal investor, who will have already begun the 
process of dissenting at that point. The basic change in appraisal activity is 
evident from Figure 1. The level of appraisal activity in 2011 and 2012 
was matched earlier only in 2007, and activity in 2013 has only increased. 
This represents a lower bound of appraisal activity in Delaware because 
some claims by dissenting shareholders are resolved before the petition is 
ever filed.
81
  
 
 
 80. If, for example, a transaction closed on December 31, 2012, and a petitioner filed for 
appraisal on January 1, 2013, the petition would be included in the statistics for 2012. 
 81. Dissenters have until 120 days after a merger closes to file an appraisal petition. See Del. 
Code Ann. tit. 8, § 262(e). Potential claims may be settled during this period without a petition ever 
being filed. Because these settlements would only be binding on the parties to them, they would not 
need to be filed publicly and are thus not reflected in our data set. Thus, the number of actual appraisal 
disputes is necessarily larger than the universe of petitions that we are able to observe. It is thus 
possible that total appraisal activity—including settlement discussions that never result in a petition 
being filed—has not increased as much as Figure 1 suggests. It may be that more appraisal petitioners 
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The recent change in appraisal activity becomes even more apparent 
when we compare appraisal claims to the number of appraisal-eligible 
mergers. From 2004 through 2010, the number of appraisal petitions 
moved roughly in tandem with the general level of merger activity, rising 
through 2007 and thereafter falling along with the number of mergers after 
the financial crisis. A more or less constant percentage of mergers 
attracted appraisal claims in this period. This pattern changed sharply, 
however, beginning in 2011. Despite a lower level of overall merger 
activity, the number of petitions filed in 2011 and 2012 matched the 
number filed at the peak of the pre-financial crisis merger wave, and the 
number of petitions in 2013 is larger still. This change in the pattern of 
appraisal litigation comes into sharper relief in Figure 2, which presents 
appraisal petitions as percentage of appraisal-eligible mergers.  
FIGURE 2 
APPRAISAL PETITIONS AS A PERCENTAGE OF APPRAISAL-ELIGIBLE 
TRANSACTIONS, 2004–2013 
 
 
 
who once would have been able to quietly settle are now being forced to file and thus make their 
claims public (and observable)—though discussions with experienced counsel make this possibility 
seem remote. 
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Approximately five percent of appraisal-eligible transactions attracted 
at least one appraisal petition from 2004 through 2010. The appraisal rate 
more than doubled in 2011 and has continued to increase since then. By 
2013, more than fifteen percent of transactions attracted an appraisal 
petition.  
The raw numbers or percentage of deals facing appraisal petitions, 
however, tell us little about the economic significance of appraisal 
litigation. Using the merger price and the number of dissenting shares, we 
can calculate the amount of foregone merger consideration in each 
appraisal dispute, obtaining at least a rough measure of the economic value 
at stake in the case.  
The values at stake in appraisal proceedings have also increased 
sharply in recent years. The 129 petitions we observed involved 106 
separate transactions over our study period. The mean value of the 
foregone merger consideration in an appraisal dispute over the entire 
period was $30 million and does not appear to have followed any strong 
trend over time. When combined with the increase in the number of 
petitions over time, however, the total dollar amount at stake in appraisal 
proceedings in each year shows a large increase in recent years, 
particularly the most recent year. Figure 3 shows the value of the 
dissenting shares in Delaware appraisal petitions for each year of our study 
period.  
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FIGURE 3 
VALUE OF DISSENTING SHARES IN DELAWARE APPRAISAL, 2004–2013 
(IN MILLIONS OF CONSTANT 2013 DOLLARS) 
 
The amount of money involved in 2013 is nearly three times the 
amount involved in any prior year and ten times the 2004 amount. To 
some extent, this effect is driven by outliers. The largest appraisal case 
over our study period is Dell, a 2013 transaction where $654 million worth 
of shares dissented. The second largest is Transkaryotic Therapies 
(“Transkaryotic”), a 2005 transaction where $520 million worth of shares 
sought appraisal.
82
 But in some ways, excluding these two very large cases 
only makes the new trend clearer. Without Transkaryotic, the values at 
stake in appraisal never exceeded $300 million in any given year; while in 
2013 the values at stake approach one billion dollars even excluding Dell. 
Most tellingly, over the ten-year period, only eight appraisal cases have 
involved more than $100 million, and four of them were in 2013.  
Perhaps the most remarkable thing about appraisal activity during the 
new 2011 to 2013 era is that, unlike 2007 and 2008, the increase in 
numbers and economic significance of appraisal does not coincide with an 
 
 
 82. In re Appraisal of Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc., No. CIV.A 1554-CC, 2007 WL 1378345, at 
*1 (Del. Ch. May 2, 2007) (noting merger consideration of $37 per share and nearly 11 million shares 
seeking appraisal). 
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increase in merger activity. In other words, the rise in appraisal activity 
since 2011 appears to reflect a secular increase in interest in appraisal, 
rather than a mere cyclical phenomenon tied to the conditions of the 
merger market. For each year in our study period, we tallied the equity 
value of all appraisal-eligible transactions and then computed the 
percentage of value that sought appraisal. In 2013, 0.92% of the equity 
value dissented, nearly three times higher than any prior year. Indeed, the 
percentage of dissenting equity value was never higher than 0.10% in any 
prior year except 2005, the year of Transkaryotic.
83
  
B. The Sophistication of Appraisal Petitioners 
In addition to the increasing volume of appraisal activity—measured 
both in number of petitions and the dollar values at stake—the profile of 
the public company appraisal petitioner has changed sharply in the recent 
period. In particular, petitioners have become increasingly specialized and 
sophisticated over our time period, with repeat petitioners increasingly 
dominating appraisal activity. Since 2011, more than eighty percent of 
appraisal proceedings have involved a repeat petitioner—that is, a 
petitioner who filed more than one appraisal petition across our study 
period. Three constellations of related funds appear more than ten times 
each. Perhaps the most striking result of our investigation is the increase in 
the economic significance of repeat players in appraisal. Figure 4 shows 
the value of shares per year in appraisal held by repeat petitioners.   
 
 
 83. In 2005, 0.37% of equity value dissented.  
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FIGURE 4 
REPEAT PETITIONER VALUE IN DELAWARE APPRAISAL, 2004–2013 
(IN MILLIONS OF CONSTANT 2013 DOLLARS) 
 
The rise in repeat petitioner value beginning in 2010 is immediately 
apparent. Before 2010, appraisal appears to have been largely a one-off 
exercise for aggrieved stockholders. Repeat petitioners played a small role, 
and there is little evidence that funds were seeking appraisal as part of a 
considered investment strategy. Starting in 2010, however, and 
accelerating through 2013, the repeat petitioner dominates. Indeed, every 
appraisal case filed in 2013 involved at least one repeat petitioner.  
By virtue of the unique standing requirements in appraisal,
84
 these 
specialized appraisal petitioners are typically able to invest in the target 
company after the announcement of the transaction they challenge. The 
decision to invest, then, is based on a calculation that the amount they will 
be able to recover in an appraisal proceeding in Delaware—via trial or 
settlement—will exceed the merger price by enough to offer an attractive 
return. This practice can be fairly characterized as appraisal arbitrage—by 
analogy to traditional merger arbitrage
85—and those who practice it may 
 
 
 84. See supra note 74, at 22. 
 85. Hedge funds have long practiced merger arbitrage, taking positions after announcement of a 
merger, intending to profit by either predicting the reaction of the stock prices of the target and 
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be termed appraisal arbitrageurs.
86
 Table 1 presents summary statistics for 
repeat dissenters. The first column reports the total value of stock the fund 
or group of funds has dissented on in our study period; the second column 
reports the number of transactions in which the fund has publicly 
dissented; the third column reports the mean value of the petitioner group 
filing the case. The second column reports the mean value of all dissenters 
in the case (including those who did not file petitions), which compared to 
the third column reveals whether the fund tends to operate by itself or 
often ends up in cases with other dissenters.  
TABLE 1 
REPEAT DISSENTERS IN DELAWARE, 2004 TO 2013 
(IN MILLIONS OF CONSTANT 2013 DOLLARS) 
Fund 
name 
Total value 
of dissenting 
stock 
Number of 
cases 
Mean value 
of petitioners 
in case 
Mean value of 
all dissenters 
in case 
Merion $718,000,000 8 $89,700,000 $107,000,000 
Magnetar $163,000,000 3 $54,400,000 $317,000,000 
Verition $96,200,000 4 $24,000,000 $37,100,000 
Merlin $51,000,000 22 $2,318,373 $5,592,174 
Quadre $18,700,000 10 $1,869,953 $4,258,385 
Patchin $22,700,000 16 $1,420,945 $1,557,664 
Predica $5,197,291 5 $1,039,458 $1,039,458 
Unlike in fiduciary litigation—where “professional plaintiffs” tend to 
be small shareholders with close ties to plaintiffs’ firms—the repeat 
appraisal petitioners, especially at the top end of the field, appear to be 
sophisticated parties specializing in appraisal. For example, the largest 
 
 
acquiring companies or by predicting the likelihood and timing of the consummation of the announced 
merger. See, e.g., INT’L MONETARY FUND, GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT 52 (Sept. 2004), 
available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/gfsr/2004/02/pdf/chp2.pdf (defining merger arbitrage); 
Mark Mitchell & Todd Pulvino, Characteristics of Risk and Return in Risk Arbitrage, 56 J. FIN. 2135 
(2001) (describing merger arbitrage strategies); Houman B. Shadab, The Law and Economics of Hedge 
Funds: Financial Innovation and Investor Protection, 6 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 240, 270 (2009) (“A type 
of corporate event driven strategy is merger arbitrage, which seeks to purchase the stock of a company 
that has just announced it will be acquired and sell short the stock of the acquiring company with the 
expectation that the acquiring company’s stock will fall after the acquisition and the acquired 
company’s stock will increase.”). 
 86. In fact, appraisal arbitrage is not true “arbitrage,” in the sense that it does not involve 
exploiting a price difference that is eventually expected to disappear. The term “arbitrage” is used 
somewhat loosely here in order to draw an analogy to merger arbitrage. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss6/7
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repeat petitioner is Merion Capital, with over $700 million invested in 
appraisal claims. Merion has been involved in seven cases since 2010, 
with increasingly large amounts at stake. The fund is based in 
Pennsylvania and headed by Andrew Barroway, a successful plaintiffs’ 
lawyer from Philadelphia. It made its first public appraisal investment in 
2010, with $8.5 million at stake. After a number of appraisal petitions 
averaging around $50 million in value at stake during 2012 and 2013, 
Merion reportedly raised a targeted amount of $1 billion for a dedicated 
appraisal fund in 2013.
87
 During 2013, it filed two appraisal petitions with 
an average value at stake of $177 million.  
Another large and recent repeat petitioner is Verition Fund, a 
Greenwich-based fund that has been involved in four cases, all in 2013, 
with an average of $25 million at stake. Verition is managed by Nicholas 
Maounis, who formerly headed Greenwich-based Amaranth Advisors.
88
 
Other recent entrants are Fortress Investment Group, a large publicly 
traded hedge fund, and Hudson Bay Capital Management, both of which 
filed large appraisal petitions in 2013. Similarly, major mutual funds and 
insurance companies—two types of institutions that have entirely avoided 
standard stockholder litigation—have recently filed appraisal petitions.89 
Much is often made of the involvement of institutional investors (or the 
lack thereof) in corporate governance.
90
 All too often in corporate 
litigation, the so-called “institutions” are akin to the Bailiffs’ Retirement 
Fund of Chippewa Falls, while sophisticated financial players remain on 
the sidelines.
91
 The institutions that are beginning to specialize in 
 
 
 87. Miles Weiss, Dell Value Dispute Spotlights Rise in Appraisal Arbitrage, BLOOMBERG NEWS, 
Oct. 2, 2013.  
 88. See Gretchen Morgenstern & Jenny Anderson, A Hedge Fund’s Loss Rattles Nerves, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 19, 2006, at C1.  
 89. Examples of mutual funds that have recently filed are T. Rowe Price (C.A. 9322-VCL) and 
John Hancock (C.A. 9350-VCL). Examples of insurance companies are Prudential (C.A. 9351-VCL) 
and Northwestern Mutual (C.A. 9321-VCL). All of these petitions challenge the merger price in the 
Dell transaction.  
 90. See, e.g., Lucian Ayre Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. 
REV. 833 (2005); Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor 
Voice, 39 UCLA L. REV. 811 (1992); Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. 
L. REV. 520 (1990); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director: An 
Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. REV. 863 (1991); Elliot J. Weiss & John S. Beckerman, 
Let the Money do the Monitoring: How Institutional Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities 
Class Actions, 104 YALE L.J. 2053 (1995). 
 91. See, e.g., Leo E. Strine, Jr., Lawrence A. Hamermesh & Matthew C. Jennejohn, Putting 
Stockholders First, Not the First-Filed Complaint, 69 BUS. LAW. 1, 11, n.36 (2013) (noting the 
prevalence of cases involving “institutional investor” plaintiffs with trivial stakes); David H. Webber, 
Private Policing of Mergers and Acquisitions: An Empirical Assessment of Institutional Lead Plaintiffs 
in Transactional Class and Derivative Actions, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 907 (2013–2014). 
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appraisal, by contrast, are among the most sophisticated financial entities 
in the United States.  
Beyond the bulge bracket appraisal petitioners are a handful of 
specialized smaller funds that have been quite active. Some join larger 
petitioner groups, perhaps to capture economies in pursuing the case. A 
larger group may make the threat to go to trial more credible, increasing 
the bargaining position of all dissenters. Two features of the Delaware 
appraisal statute make this strategy possible. First, after the merger closes, 
a dissenter stockholder is entitled under Section 262(e) to demand a 
statement of the aggregate number of shares demanding appraisal from the 
surviving company.
92
 A dissenter might seek this information to confirm 
the existence of other dissenters who, for example, can help spread the 
costs of prosecuting the appraisal case. If the dissenter does not like the 
results of the information supplied by the company, it has a statutory right 
to withdraw its dissent and accept the merger consideration.
93
  
C. The Increasingly Competitive World of Appraisal Litigation 
The manner in which appraisal litigation proceeds also appears to be 
changing in ways that may indicate increasing competition among 
appraisal petitioners. Dissenting shareholders have 120 days following the 
merger’s effective date to file a petition in court demanding the judicial 
appraisal.
94
 That 120-day period can often be a time for negotiation, and 
the parties may settle their dispute before ever filing a claim. Figure 5 
shows a kernel density plot
95
 of filing times from the effective date of the 
merger for two appraisal petitions challenging two sets of mergers: 
(1) those from 2004 through 2010, shown in black and (2) those from 
2011 through 2013, shown in gray.   
 
 
 92. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(e) (2015). 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. A kernel density plot is essentially a smoothed histogram, treating each observed instance as 
representing a larger unobserved population. 
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FIGURE 5 
The black line suggests that petitioners commonly took the entire 120 
days to negotiate over their disputes before filing in the 2004 through 2010 
period. The gray line shows the lag between the merger and the filing from 
2011 through 2013, and reveals that parties are filing their petitions much 
faster, more often not bothering to go through an initial round of 
settlement discussions before filing. We can only speculate on the causes 
of this, but one explanation may indeed be increasing competition among 
shareholders dissenting on the same transaction. One of the advantages of 
filing is that it compels the surviving company to identify publicly all 
other shareholders who have preserved the right to seek appraisal.
96
 Doing 
so may make it harder for other dissenting shareholders to strike a separate 
bargain without including the filing shareholder. Filing faster may also 
provide an advantage in selecting lead counsel and managing the claims. 
The new filing pattern may also indicate that petitioners do not believe 
that claims are likely to settle without substantial litigation activity, and 
they may be anxious to proceed to discovery. In any event, we tentatively 
 
 
 96. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(f) (2015). 
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interpret this shift as a sign that appraisal arbitrage is becoming more 
competitive.  
D. What Explains the Rise in Appraisal Arbitrage? 
We lack a compelling explanation for the rise in appraisal arbitrage 
identified here. We can, however, confidently dismiss two theories that 
have sometimes been offered by defense-side lawyers to explain this 
increase.  
The first theory that has often been floated is that a 2007 Chancery 
decision called In re Appraisal of Transkaryotic Therapies
97
 opened the 
floodgates for appraisal litigation.
98
 The Transkaryotic opinion arose from 
an extremely large appraisal proceeding involving nearly half a billion 
dollars in foregone merger consideration.
99
 Many of the shareholders 
seeking appraisal had acquired their stock after the record date for voting 
in the merger, but before the actual vote on the merger.
100
 The court held 
that holders of shares acquired during that period were eligible to pursue 
appraisal, despite the inability of the petitioners to show how the shares 
had been voted, so long as the total number of shares seeking appraisal did 
not exceed the total number of “no” votes plus abstentions.101 According 
to defense attorneys, appraisal arbitrageurs “are taking advantage of the 
flexibility of Transkaryotic.”102  
The trouble with this explanation is that the Transkaryotic holding—in 
addition to coming out nearly four years before the recent surge in 
appraisal activity—created only a marginal increase in the window of time 
 
 
 97. No. Civ.A. 1554-CC, 2007 WL 1378345, at *1 (Del. Ch. 2007). 
 98. See, e.g., Trevor S. Norwitz, Delaware Legislature Should Act to Curb Appraisal Arbitrage 
Abuses, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Feb. 2, 2010), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2015/02/10/ 
delaware-legislature-should-act-to-curb-appraisal-arbitrage-abuses (claiming appraisal arbitrage was 
“spawned by Transkaryotic”); Daniel E. Wolf et al., Appraisal Rights—The Next Frontier in Deal 
Litigation?, KIRKLAND & ELLIS (May 1, 2013), http://www.kirkland.com/siteFiles/Publications/ 
MAUpdate_050113.pdf (describing the Transkaryotic decision as significant factor in the rise of 
appraisal litigation).  
 99. In re Transkaryotic, at *1 (noting merger consideration of $37 per share and nearly 11 
million shares seeking appraisal). 
 100. Id. (noting that approximately 8 million out of 11 million shares were purchased after the 
record date). 
 101. Id. at *4. More precisely, since the record holder of the relevant shares in Transakaryotic was 
Cede & Co. (as is the case for most publicly traded shares), the plaintiffs simply needed to show that 
Cede & Co. itself held more shares that had voted “no” or abstained than the number of shares for 
which appraisal was being sought. Id. at *5 (“Only the record holder possesses and may perfect 
appraisal rights. The statute simply does not allow consideration of the beneficial owner in this 
context.”). 
 102. Weiss, supra note 87. 
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during which would-be appraisal petitioners may buy stock. Weeks or 
months typically pass between the announcement of a transaction and the 
record date, and stock acquired in that period has always been available 
for appraisal. A company’s preliminary proxy statement, of course, may 
disclose new information that would make an appraisal claim more 
attractive, and the Transkaryotic ruling allows potential investors more 
time to consider the proxy contents. By the same token, the Transkaryotic 
ruling also ensures that companies cannot set the record date 
opportunistically to preclude appraisal claims. The more fundamental 
problem with relying on the Transkaryotic decision to explain the rise in 
appraisal claims is that Transkaryotic is only relevant in a transaction 
structure that contemplates a shareholder vote, and many do not. In a 
tender offer followed by a Section 251(h) merger, a short-form merger, or 
a merger approved by written consent of a majority of holders, no 
shareholder vote is required and thus the Transkaryotic ruling can have 
had no impact. These types of transactions constitute a substantial portion 
of M&A activity, and an even larger proportion of appraisal targets.  
To investigate the possible role of Transkaryotic, we separated out 
transactions that were affected by the ruling and those that were not, and 
examined the change in appraisal litigation for each group. Our data show 
that the rise in appraisal activity appears strongest outside of the 
transaction structure affected by Transkaryotic. The Chancery Court 
issued the Transkaryotic decision in the summer of 2008. During the 
period from 2004 to 2007, stockholders filed appraisal petitions in 
approximately 5% of transactions structured as a tender offer and 
approximately 5% of those structured as a standard merger with a 
shareholder vote subject to the Transkaryotic rule. If the Transkaryotic 
ruling mattered, we would expect to see that transactions affected by the 
ruling would be more likely to involve an appraisal petition. We find the 
opposite. In the post-Transkaryotic era, from 2009 to 2013, stockholders 
dissented in approximately 9% of transactions subject to Transkaryotic. 
By contrast, in tender offer deals—which were entirely unaffected by the 
ruling in Transkaryotic—the appraisal rate was 13%. These numbers 
suggest that whatever legal changes were wrought by the Transkaryotic 
decision do not appear to have moved the needle on appraisal activity.  
The second explanation sometimes offered is centered on the interest 
rates available to appraisal petitioners. Appraisal petitioners are entitled to 
interest on amounts recovered in their petitions from the effective date of 
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the merger. Delaware amended its appraisal statute in 2007
103
 to set the 
interest rate equal to the federal funds rate plus five percent, compounded 
quarterly.
104
 Some lawyers have suggested that in an era of historically 
low interest rates, the interest rate available to appraisal petitioners has 
attracted investors to appraisal.
105
 The apparent theory is that an investor 
could park money in an appraisal claim, and even if the court found the 
merger price to represent fair value, the investor would receive an 
attractive return. Vice Chancellor Glasscock, too, has voiced a “concern 
about whether the interest rate that the Legislature has set encourages 
these types of appraisal cases.”106  
In our view, the statutory interest rate cannot account for the rise in 
appraisal activity. As an initial matter, the timing does not line up: interest 
rates dropped precipitously in 2009, two years before the sharp rise in 
appraisal activity. More fundamentally, it is unlikely that a five percent 
premium over the federal funds rate would represent an attractive return 
under the circumstances, given the substantial risks associated with an 
appraisal proceeding. Appraisal petitioners function as unsecured creditors 
of the surviving company, holding a claim of uncertain value to be 
determined by litigation. While the statutory rate no doubt is better than 
what petitioners could get in a money market account, it likely 
undercompensates them for the risk of their position. The appraisal interest 
rate surely defrays some of the risk, particularly compared to other 
conventional measures of interest in legal scenarios. But petitioners are 
exposed not only to the credit risk of the surviving company, but also to 
the financial risk associated with the trial. Petitioners are only entitled to 
demand an award of interest if they take their claims all the way to trial, 
which typically takes well over a year and carries with it the risk that the 
appraised value could be less than the foregone merger consideration. The 
idea that sophisticated investors are pouring hundreds of millions of 
 
 
 103. See 76 Laws 1998, ch. 145 §§ 11–17, eff. July 17, 2007. 
 104. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (“Unless the Court in its discretion determines otherwise 
for good cause shown, interest from the effective date of the merger through the date of the payment of 
the judgment shall be compounded quarterly and shall accrue at 5% over the Federal Reserve discount 
rate . . . .”). 
 105. See Daniel E. Wolf, Appraisal Rights—The Next Frontier in Deal Litigation?, HARVARD 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE BLOG (May 16, 2013, 9:30 AM) (“In today’s ultra-low interest rate setting, 
the accumulating interest payments represent, if not an intriguing stand-alone investment opportunity, 
at least a meaningful offset to the extended period of illiquidity and litigation costs imposed on the 
dissenting shareholders for the duration of the proceedings.”).  
 106. Transcript of Scheduling Conference at 18, In re ISN Software Corp. Appraisal Litig. (Sept. 
23, 2013).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss6/7
  
 
 
 
 
2015] APPRAISAL ARBITRAGE 1581 
 
 
 
 
dollars into risky appraisal proceedings to chase above-market interest 
rates simply is not credible.  
Yet another potential explanation for the rise of appraisal litigation is 
that it is simply part of the roughly contemporaneous trend in merger 
litigation. As others have shown, fiduciary class actions challenging 
mergers have recently become ubiquitous, touching over 90% of 
transactions above $100 million.
107
 Our own data on fiduciary challenges 
to mergers—which cover only appraisal-eligible transactions—confirm 
this same phenomenon. In 2004, 36% of transactions attracted a fiduciary 
challenge; by 2013, 90% of transactions did. Figure 6 shows the trend in 
fiduciary litigation from 2004 to 2013 in gray and plotted on the left axis, 
and it shows the trend in appraisal litigation over the same period in black 
and plotted on the right axis. 
FIGURE 6: THE RISE OF FIDUCIARY AND APPRAISAL LITIGATION,  
2004–2013 
 
 
 107. See Matthew D. Cain & Steven M. Davidoff, Takeover Litigation in 2012 (Feb. 1, 2013), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2216727 (finding that ninety-two percent of all transactions with 
a value greater than $100 million experienced litigation in 2012). See also Robert M. Daines & Olga 
Koumrian, Shareholder Litigation Involving Mergers and Acquisitions, CORNERSTONE RESEARCH 
(Feb. 2013 Update), available at www.cornerstone.com/files/upload/Cornerstone_Research_ 
Shareholder_Litigation_Involving_M_and_A_Feb_2013.pdf (making similar findings). 
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Fiduciary litigation rose sharply in 2009, and since 2010, stockholders 
have challenged more than eighty-five percent of transactions. The rise in 
appraisal litigation did not start until 2011, two years after the litigation 
rate rose in fiduciary litigation. It certainly could be the case that there is 
some connection between the rise in the two types of litigation, given that 
they both involve legal action relating to mergers. Beyond these 
superficial similarities, however, there is no reason to conclude any 
connection between the two types of litigation. The parties who appear to 
be driving appraisal arbitrage—the sophisticated investors we described 
above—have little connection to fiduciary litigation and historically have 
had no interest in it. There are thus no grounds to suspect that the rise in 
appraisal activity has anything to do with the rise of fiduciary litigation.  
In the end, we can identify no single causative factor to account for the 
rise in appraisal arbitrage. We suspect that it may simply be a case of a 
few investors who, somewhat by accident, found themselves considering 
appraisal as a method for salvaging an investment following a bad merger, 
became intrigued by the opportunity, and explored it further. As word 
spread of their success, others mimicked the strategy. Indeed, the 
Transkaryotic transaction itself—and not the judicial opinion that grew out 
of it—may have functioned as a catalyst for interest in appraisal. Among 
the class of dissenting shareholders in Transkaryotic were some of the 
most sophisticated entities on Wall Street, including various Carl Icahn 
affiliates, SAC Capital Advisors, and Millennium Management.
108
 
Transkaryotic was acquired by Shire Plc for $37 per share.
109
 Appraisal 
cases that settle are not made public because unlike standard shareholder 
litigation they do not bind non-signatories.
110
 But Shire is a public 
company and had to disclose developments in the litigation in its periodic 
SEC reports. Shire announced the settlement of the Transkaryotic claims 
in November 2008,
111
 and it disclosed that the settlement “paid the same 
price of $37 per share originally offered to all TKT shareholders at the 
time of the July 2005 merger, plus interest.”112 This account of the 
 
 
 108. See Petitioners’ Answering Brief in Oppositionn to Respondents’ Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment, In re Appraisal of Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc., 2006 WL 4790526 (Del. Ch. 
2006) (listing entities seeking appraisal). 
 109. See In re Transkaryotic, 2007 WL 1378345, at *1. 
 110. See Siegel, supra note 50, at 84, n.17 (noting that “[t]here is no way to document the number 
of appraisal settlements.”). 
 111. See Press Release, Shire Plc., Shire Successfully Settles Former TKT Shareholder (Nov. 12, 
2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/936402/000095010308002790/dp11808_ 
ex9901.htm. 
 112. Shire Plc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 27, 2009).  
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Transkaryotic settlement frequently appears in subsequent retellings of the 
case.
113
  
This description of the settlement, however, obscures its significance. 
First of all, paying interest in a settlement is puzzling: a settling acquirer is 
under no obligation to include interest in the settlement, and, in any event, 
this case was filed before Delaware adopted the statutory interest rate 
discussed above. Moreover, from the petitioners’ perspective, the label 
attached to the settlement funds is unimportant—a dollar is a dollar, 
whether it is part of the “settlement price” or the “interest” on the 
settlement price. Shire only disclosed the aggregate interest award,
114
 but 
by dividing this amount by the number of shares seeking appraisal it is 
possible to determine the per share figure for the entire settlement: 
precisely $50 per share. Thus, the amount of the “interest” award appears 
to have been reverse-engineered to achieve a pre-determined (and 
favorable) per-share settlement price. The net result was that the 
petitioners recovered a thirty-five percent premium on what would remain 
the largest appraisal claim in history until the Dell case in 2013. The 
successful result in Transkaryotic, though it was partially concealed, might 
in fact be a major part of what has sparked interest in appraisal.  
III. DOES APPRAISAL TARGET THE RIGHT TRANSACTIONS?  
Given the increasing incidence of appraisal litigation, and the sharply 
increasing amounts at stake, examining the policy implications of 
appraisal becomes a matter of some urgency. This Part and the next begin 
this examination. We hypothesize that the structure of appraisal 
litigation—which provides strong incentives for stockholders but not their 
attorneys—ought to lead to litigation that bears markers of litigation merit. 
In our empirical analysis, we find strong evidence in favor of this 
hypothesis. Appraisal petitioners target deals where the merger premium is 
low and where controlling stockholders are taking the company private.   
 
 
 113. See Geis, supra note 34, at 1639–40 (2011) (“[D]espite the favorable summary judgment 
ruling, petitioners in Transkaryotic eventually settled their claim for the initial $37 merger 
consideration (plus interest), thereby throwing their claims of purported price inadequacy into 
question.”). See also Weiss, supra note 87 (“The case was eventually settled for $37 a share, the same 
price paid in the merger, plus interest.”).  
 114. See Shire Plc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 27, 2009) (disclosing “interest” of $147.6 
million on a “settlement” of $419.9 million).  
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A. The Unique Structure of Appraisal Litigation 
At least superficially, there is some reason to fear that appraisal 
litigation—as a species of shareholder litigation—will share some of the 
well-known pathologies of shareholder litigation. In other types of 
shareholder litigation—like derivative suits or class actions alleging 
violations of fiduciary duties in mergers—the actual plaintiff is largely 
irrelevant. The plaintiffs’ attorneys face all of the meaningful incentives in 
such litigation,
115
 and the agency problem between the attorneys and the 
class of shareholders can oftentimes be severe.
116
 Plaintiffs in shareholder 
litigation generally have only nominal control over their attorneys,
117
 and 
the attorneys typically have de facto control over all litigation decisions, 
including the decision to settle and the terms on which the settlement will 
take place. The danger, then, is that attorneys will (1) bring non-
meritorious claims in hopes of settling quickly for a generous award of 
fees—essentially a nuisance payment—and (2) settle meritorious claims 
for less than the discounted settlement value because they can be bought 
off by the defendants in settlement. Both outcomes are bad for 
shareholders, and potentially for allocative efficiency. As a result, a large 
literature exists questioning the extent to which the merits matter in 
shareholder actions.
118
  
Most recently and most relevantly, we performed a study assessing the 
merits of fiduciary duty class actions challenging merger transactions.
119
 
In a merger transaction, the chief concern to shareholders will generally be 
the amount of the merger consideration.
120
 If the merits mattered in merger 
litigation, we would expect there to be an inverse relationship between the 
 
 
 115. See, e.g., Brian J.M. Quinn, Shareholder Lawsuits, Status Quo Bias, and Adoption of the 
Exclusive Forum Provision, U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 137, 151 (2010) (“This type of litigation is highly 
susceptible to agency costs because the interests of counsel will not always align with the interests of 
their purported clients, the shareholders.”); Thompson & Thomas, supra note 77, at 148 (“[T]he 
entrepreneurial attorney’s interests can diverge from those of the clients. If class counsel have 
tremendous discretion to run the litigation, they may do so in a manner that maximizes their benefit, 
even at the expense of the interests of their putative clients.”).  
 116. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing Fairness 
and Efficiency, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 883 (1987) (“It is no secret that substantial conflicts of interest 
between attorney and client can arise in class action litigation. In the language of economics, this is an 
‘agency cost’ problem.”) (footnote omitted). 
 117. See id. at 884–86. 
 118. For summaries of this voluminous literature, see Stephen J. Choi, The Evidence on Securities 
Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1465 (2004); James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Does the Plaintiff 
Matter? An Empirical Analysis of Lead Plaintiffs in Securities Class Actions, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 
1587 (2006); Korsmo & Myers, supra note 15.  
 119. Korsmo & Myers, supra note 15.  
 120. See id. at 854. 
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size of the merger premium and the likelihood of a class action being 
filed.
121
 In fact, we found that there was only a very weak correlation 
between the merger premium
122
 and the likelihood of a fiduciary duty class 
action.
123
 Instead, the strongest predictor of a fiduciary duty class action 
was the deal size,
124
 suggesting that plaintiffs’ attorneys are primarily 
seeking to maximize the nuisance value of suits by going after deep 
pockets and large transactions.
125
  
If a similar dynamic were at work in appraisal litigation—which, of 
course, also targets merger transactions—the increase in appraisal activity 
would be cause for alarm. The structure of appraisal litigation, however, is 
such that this is far less likely than for other forms of shareholder 
litigation. Two features distinguish appraisal. First, as detailed above, 
there are no class claims in appraisal.
126
 This means that an attorney 
cannot make an arrangement with a small shareholder (one who owns a 
single share, at the extreme) and seek to represent the entire class of 
shareholders.
127
 It also means that the potential recovery is limited by the 
size of the plaintiff’s holdings. In addition, the presence of a genuine 
plaintiff with a meaningful economic stake makes a collusive settlement 
between the petitioner’s attorney and the defendant corporation 
 
 
 121. See id. at 835. 
 122. In assessing the size of the merger premium, we controlled for deal size, industry, and year of 
the transaction. Id. at 872. 
 123. See Korsmo & Myers, supra note 15, at 877 
 124. Id. at 874. 
 125. Id. at 836. 
 126. See, e.g., Alabama By-Products Corp. v. Cede & Co., 657 A.2d 254, 260 n.10 (Del. 1995) 
(“In an appraisal proceeding, however, shareholders enter the appraisal class by complying with the 
statutory formalities required to perfect their appraisal rights. Thus, shareholders seeking appraisal ‘opt 
in’ to a class, invariably before suit is even filed, rather than ‘opt out.’”); 2 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE, supra note 3, at 267 n.6 (“[T]he appraisal remedy differs from the procedural rules 
applicable to the class action, which assume that investors who do not ‘opt out’ desire to be 
represented.”); Aronstam, Balotti, & Rehbock, supra note 45, at 547 (“[T]he appraisal statute creates 
an “opt-in” class for minority shareholders as opposed to the “opt-out” default mechanism of class 
action lawsuits. Thus, only shareholders specifically electing to opt in will be able to benefit from a 
judicial determination diverging from the corporation’s initial valuation.”) (footnotes omitted); 
Thompson, supra note 31, at 41 (“No provision is made for a class action or other means that would 
permit shareholders in a common situation to share an attorney and other expenses of litigation 
easily.”) (footnote omitted); see, e.g., Fried & Ganor, supra note 45, at 1004 n.105 (“In Delaware, 
shareholders seeking appraisal are barred from using class action suits. Because each shareholder must 
pursue his own individual claim, shareholders lose the important economic benefits of class actions, 
which spread the costs of litigation and facilitate contingency financing.”).  
 127. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in Class Action and 
Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 3 
(1991) (“[P]laintiffs’ class and derivative attorneys function essentially as entrepreneurs who bear a 
substantial amount of the litigation risk and exercise nearly plenary control over all important 
decisions in the lawsuit.”). 
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impossible.
128
 Second, Delaware’s appraisal statute does not provide for 
the allocation of plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees to the defendant. As a result, the 
attorney’s only route to a fee is, again, through an actual plaintiff.129  
Furthermore, the sole issue at stake in an appraisal action is the fair 
value of the plaintiff’s shares. This distinction is crucial for at least two 
reasons. First, the single-issue nature of the claim precludes the typical 
shareholder litigation phenomenon of collusive “disclosure only” 
settlements whereby the defendants pay a sizeable cash fee to the 
plaintiffs’ attorneys, while providing only non-monetary window dressing 
to the shareholders themselves.
130
 An appraisal case can only settle for 
cash. Second, the narrow focus of appraisal litigation reduces the nuisance 
value of an appraisal petition. Nuisance suits may be profitable whenever 
defendants are risk-averse or face asymmetric litigation costs.
131
 While 
 
 
 128. See id. at 5 (“The named plaintiff [in a fiduciary class action] does little—indeed, usually 
does nothing—to monitor the attorney in order to ensure that representation is competent and zealous, 
or to align the interests of the attorney with those of the class or corporation.”). 
 129. The Delaware appraisal statute envisions two types of litigation expenses: 1) the court costs 
of the proceeding itself, including the cost of a court-appointed appraiser; and 2) attorney and expert 
witness fees. The statute provides that the costs of the proceeding may be allocated to the parties as 
determined by the court, but “makes no mention of judicial discretion to allocate one party’s expert 
and attorney expenses to its opponent.” Siegel, supra note 50, at 241.  
 The Delaware courts customarily allocate court costs to the defendant absent bad faith on the part 
of the plaintiff. See, e.g., Tri-Continental Corp. v. Battye, 74 A.2d 71, 77 (Del. 1950) (same); Meade v. 
Pac. Gamble Robinson Co., 58 A.2d 415, 418 (Del. 1948) (allocating court costs to the defendant 
absent bad faith); In re Appraisal of Shell Oil Co., No. 8080, 1990 Del. Ch. LEXIS 199, at *103 (Del. 
Ch. Dec. 11, 1990) (citing section 262(j) and assessing court costs against the defendant); Lehman v. 
Nat’l Union Electric Co., No. 4964, 1980 Del. Ch. LEXIS 490, at *3-4 (Del. Ch. Nov. 5, 1980) 
(finding that the plaintiff’s good faith belief in the merits of his claim, even though unreasonable, was 
enough to justify allocating court costs to the defendant). The Delaware courts have, however, 
interpreted the statute to not allow the shifting of the plaintiff’s attorney and expert witness fees to the 
defendants under most circumstances. See, e.g., Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 684 A.2d 289, 301 
(Del. 1996) (“In the absence of an equitable exception, the plaintiff in an appraisal proceeding should 
bear the burden of paying its own expert witnesses and attorneys.”); Pinson v. Campbell-Taggart, Inc., 
1989 WL 17438, at *1109-10 (Del. Ch. 1989) (“By its own terms the [appraisal] statute does not 
authorize the Court to tax a petitioning stockholder’s attorneys’ fees and other litigation expenses 
against the surviving corporation. Those expenses are recoverable only by a pro rata apportionment 
against the value of the shares entitled to an appraisal.”) (citation omitted). The Delaware courts have 
recognized an equitable exception to the rule that the plaintiff always bears her own attorney’s and 
expert’s fees, however, this exception is narrow, and will not apply in the run of cases. Mary Siegel 
describes Delaware courts as giving the equitable exception a “narrow construction,” applying “upon 
evidence of a party’s egregious conduct.” Siegel, supra note 50, at 241–42. We have located only one 
appraisal case where the court applied the equitable exception to assign the plaintiff’s attorney and 
expert costs to the defendant. See Montgomery Cellular Holding Co., Inc. v. Dobler, 880 A.2d 206, 
228–29 (Del. 2005) (finding that the destruction of evidence, failure to respond to discovery request, 
use of “fatally flawed” expert testimony, and the CEO’s lying under oath justified allocating all of the 
plaintiff’s costs to the defendant). 
 130. See supra note 5.  
 131. As Janet Cooper Alexander summarized the economic arguments, “high litigation costs and 
uncertainty about trial outcomes can lead to the settlement of frivolous suits.” Janet Cooper Alexander, 
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calculating fair value is far from easy, the single-issue nature of the claim 
renders the proceeding relatively straightforward, and the scope of 
discovery is limited to materials bearing on the company’s value. To be 
sure, where one party seeks to use the merger price itself as evidence of 
fair value, somewhat more sweeping discovery into the process that led to 
that price may be necessary. But compared to other forms of shareholder 
litigation, the proceeding is relatively simple and thus inexpensive, 
reducing the nuisance value of a claim.
132
  
The litigation risk faced by the parties is also far more symmetric in 
appraisal litigation than in other forms of shareholder litigation. Aggregate 
shareholder litigation creates the possibility of catastrophic damages or an 
injunction. Damages in appraisal are limited to the fair value of the actual 
petitioner’s shares. Moreover, the petitioner has real skin in the game, as 
well. Not only may filing a petition entail substantial upfront cost, courts 
in appraisal actions can—and occasionally do133—determine the fair value 
of the plaintiff’s shares to be less than the merger consideration.134 In 
contrast, fiduciary duty class action plaintiffs have typically already 
received the merger consideration and face no financial downside, giving 
 
 
Do The Merits Matter?, 43 STAN. L. REV. at 502 n.10 (1991). See also Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Suing 
Solely to Extract a Settlement Offer, J. LEGAL. STUD. 437 (1988); John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the 
Private Attorney General: Why the Model of the Lawyer as Bounty Hunter is Not Working, 42 MD. L. 
REV. 215 (1983); Jill E. Fisch, Class Action Reform: Lessons from Securities Litigation, 39 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 533 (1997); D. Rosenberg & S. Shavell, A Model in Which Suits Are Brought for Their Nuisance 
Value, 5 INT’L. REV. L. & ECON. 3 (1985). 
 132. There is also reason to believe that litigation costs will be more symmetric, greatly reducing 
the in terrorem value of an appraisal petition. The open-ended nature and scienter aspects of fraud or 
fiduciary duty claims makes it easy for plaintiffs to justify sweeping discovery requests for, say, all e-
mails from dozens of top executives. These requests impose crushing and asymmetric costs on 
defendants, who may then find it cheaper to simply pay a nuisance settlement. Such “fishing 
expeditions” will less often be justifiable in an appraisal proceeding, where the sole merits issue is the 
fair value of the company. Likewise, the parties will generally face similar costs in hiring experts to 
conduct valuations and testify at trial. The lack of aggregate litigation also reduces litigation cost 
asymmetries in that plaintiffs are not able to spread costs across the class of all shareholders. See 
Korsmo & Myers, supra note 15. 
 133. Courts in Delaware do not treat the merger price as a floor in appraisal valuations. In our 
examination of appraisal opinions, 5 of the 40 opinions (twelve-and-a-half percent) gave the appraisal 
petitioners a lower price than they would have received in the merger. The lowest gave the petitioner 
an award that was 19.8% lower than the merger price. Thus, while appraisal petitioners might face an 
attractive expected return, it comes with considerable risk—both sides have something to lose. As 
noted supra at 38, the appraisal petitioner essentially becomes an unsecured creditor of the acquirer, 
with no set time frame for getting his money back and a substantial chance of ultimately being entitled 
to less than he would have received in the merger. 
 134. See Siegel, supra note 50, at 104 (“[S]hareholders in appraisal actions risk the possibility of 
receiving less than the transaction price.”). 
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fiduciary litigation a costless option value that is absent in appraisal 
actions.
135
 
Furthermore, the distorting effects of insurance play less of a role in 
appraisal. For most types of shareholder litigation, the potential for a 
nuisance settlement is heightened by the ubiquity of liability insurance for 
directors and officers. Such insurance policies will pay some or all of the 
costs of a settlement, so long as the defendants are not found culpable at 
trial.
136
 As a result, defendants face a strong incentive to settle weak 
claims rather than run a small risk of personal liability. In an appraisal 
proceeding, any recovery simply comes from the acquirer, and the 
culpability and personal liability of the target company’s board are not at 
issue. 
In sum, the agency problem—ubiquitous in aggregate shareholder 
litigation—is absent from appraisal litigation, and the parties to an 
appraisal proceeding face far more symmetric costs and risks from 
litigation, greatly reducing the in terrorem value of nuisance suits. There is 
thus strong reason to believe that appraisal litigation will be more 
meritorious, on average, than other forms of shareholder litigation.
137
 
B. An Empirical Examination of the Merits of Appraisal Litigation 
In evaluating whether the merits matter, we seek to determine how 
mergers are selected for appraisal litigation. Are plaintiffs targeting deals 
where there is reason to believe the merger consideration was inadequate? 
Or are they simply seeking deep pockets that may be willing to settle for 
 
 
 135. Id. 
 136. See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 131, at 550 (arguing that “[t]he existence and operation of 
insurance and indemnification may be the most important factor in creating a system of settlements 
that do not reflect the merits.”); Choi, supra note 118, at 1469 (noting that “many companies have 
liability insurance policies for their directors and officers, many of which will not pay if the directors 
or officers are found culpable at trial . . . Rather than face this prospect (even if unlikely), directors and 
officers will often settle, relying on the [D&O] liability insurers to pay most, if not all, of the 
settlement award.”); Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litigation Without Foundation?, 7 J. L. 
ECON. & ORG. 55, 57 (1991) (“[A]ll states permit corporations to purchase D&O insurance for their 
executives, and policies can cover losses that cannot be indemnified. Policies routinely exempt losses 
from adjudication of dishonesty, but if a claim is settled, courts prohibit insurers from seeking an 
adjudication of guilt and thereby avoiding the claim’s payment.”); see also Securities Litigation 
Reform: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Telecomm. Fin. of the Comm. on Energy Commerce, 103d 
Cong. 1 (1994) (statement of Vincent E. O’Brien) (claiming that 96% of securities class action 
settlements are within the D&O insurance coverage limits, with the insurance usually the lone source 
of the settlement proceeds). 
 137. The reasons for thinking the merits will matter in appraisal are, in fact, so strong that we used 
appraisal litigation as a benchmark of merit against which to contrast apparently non-merits-related 
fiduciary duty challenges to merger transactions. See Korsmo & Myers, supra note 15. 
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nuisance value? Davidoff and Cain, for example, find that nearly 95% of 
all mergers with a deal size greater than $100 million result in some form 
of shareholder litigation.
138
  
If this dynamic were also at work in appraisal actions, we would expect 
to see large merger transactions to be disproportionately targeted for 
appraisal petitions, and for the adequacy of the merger price to have little 
or no predictive power.
139
 Until recently, an empirical investigation of this 
question has been impossible, due to a lack of data on the characteristics 
of appraisal litigation.
140
 Using our hand-collected data set,
141
 however, it 
is possible to examine the selection of merger transactions by appraisal 
petitioners.  
Out of 1168 appraisal-eligible transactions for which litigation data 
was available, 683 attracted at least one fiduciary class action.
142
 By 
contrast, only 87 transactions involved a counseled appraisal petition, with 
an additional seven transactions attracting only pro se petitions.
143
 Table 2 
presents the general pattern of litigation.   
 
 
 138. Davidoff and Cain, for example, find that nearly all mergers with a deal size greater than 
$100 million result in some form of shareholder litigation. See Cain & Davidoff, supra note 107 
(finding that 92% of all transactions with a value greater than $100 million experienced litigation in 
2012). Similarly, Curtis and Morley recently studied excessive-fee litigation in the mutual fund 
industry. See Quinn Curtis & John Morley, An Empirical Study of Mutual Fund Excessive Fee 
Litigation: Do the Merits Matter? (working paper) (2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
1852652. They found that the size of the fee charged by a mutual fund was not a statistically 
significant predictor of the incidence of litigation. The single strongest predictor was simply the value 
of the assets under management of the relevant mutual fund family—large, rich fund families attract 
litigation. They interpret this result to suggest that the filing of excessive-fee litigation is largely driven 
by the search for deep pockets, rather than by the charging high fees. Id. 
 139. There may be some reason to expect larger deals to attract more appraisal action, in that a 
larger corporation is likely to have more minority shareholders with a large enough stake to potentially 
justify the costs of an appraisal action. Nonetheless, we would expect the size of the merger premium 
to be the most predictive single variable. 
 140. A version of some of the findings presented here are also presented in Korsmo & Myers, 
supra note 14. 
 141. We compiled a set of transactions from the Thomson One database of merger transactions 
with Delaware-incorporated, public company targets that closed between 2004 and the end of 2013, a 
period corresponding to the appraisal cases we collected from the Delaware dockets. We restricted our 
sample of transactions to those where appraisal was available. For this same universe of transactions, 
we also collected data on the incidence of classic fiduciary class action litigation and the outcomes of 
that litigation. Our resulting dataset thus includes all transactions involving public corporations 
incorporated in Delaware for which a shareholder could have mounted a fiduciary challenge, an 
appraisal proceeding, or both. For each transaction, we then determined whether shareholders pursued 
either or both. This allows us to compare the selection of merger transactions for challenge via 
different types of shareholder litigation. For a more complete description of the data on fiduciary duty 
class actions, see Korsmo & Myers, supra note 15. 
 142. Id. at 868. 
 143. Id. 
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TABLE 2 
INCIDENCE OF FIDUCIARY CLAIMS AND APPRAISAL CLAIMS 
 
 
Fiduciary class action 
No Yes Total 
A
p
p
ra
is
a
l 
(c
o
u
n
se
le
d
) No 470 612 1082 
Yes 15 71 86 
Total 485 683 1168 
A major difficulty in determining whether the merits matter in much 
shareholder litigation—involving issues of scienter and breach of fiduciary 
duty, for example—is that the merits are generally not easy to evaluate. 
The only issue in an appraisal action, however, is the fair value of the 
plaintiffs’ shares, and the sole remedy is accordingly very 
straightforward—cash in exchange for the shares.144 As we have argued 
elsewhere,
145
 per share cash recovery is likely to be the only truly 
meaningful relief—and thus the best measure of the merits—even in non-
appraisal merger litigation. This simplicity offers a rare opportunity to 
assess the merits of a claim. The merits of appraisal actions are easy to 
perceive.
146
  
In evaluating how appraisal petitioners select disputes for litigation, we 
examined two principal metrics. The first represents the size of the 
transaction,
147
 which we do not consider directly relevant to the merits. 
 
 
 144. See supra note 63. 
 145. See Korsmo and Myers, supra note 15. 
 146. The notion of “merit” or “frivolousness” in litigation is more slippery than it may first 
appear. See Robert G. Bone, Modeling Frivolous Suits, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 519, 529–33 (1997) 
(considering and rejecting a number of common definitions of “frivolous litigation”). We will speak, 
somewhat loosely, of a suit being “merits-related” when either the decision to bring the suit or the 
disposition of the suit are more related to the expected damages at trial than to other factors, such as 
the ability to inflict litigation costs on the defendant and thus extract a settlement. An advantage of the 
approach used here is that we measure the relative influence of merit-related variables and non-merit 
related variables on the decision to bring suit, rather than arbitrarily defining some cut-off for 
“frivolous” litigation (i.e., all suits settled in less than one year; all suits settled for less than $2 
million). See Korsmo & Myers, supra note 15. 
 147. Ideally, we would use the size of the acquiring firm, rather than that of the target firm, as the 
measure of “deep pockets.” It is, after all, the acquiring firm that will pay any judgment. 
Unfortunately, using the size of the acquiring firm is not possible. Many of the acquiring firms are not 
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The second represents the adequacy of the merger consideration, which is 
relevant to the merits. We examine these two metrics below. A large 
merger premium should suggest a weak appraisal claim and a small 
merger premium should suggest a strong merger claim, all else being 
equal. By contrast, we would expect there to be little or no relationship 
between the sheer size of a transaction and the merit of a claim.
148
  
1. The Unimportance of Transaction Size 
To examine the effect of deal size on the likelihood of appraisal, we 
used two measures of the value of the transaction: (1) “enterprise value” 
(the total merger consideration); and (2) “equity value” (the amount of 
merger consideration allocated to the shareholders). Both are calculated in 
constant 2013 dollars. Table 3 reports the mean and median sizes of both 
measures of transaction size across various categories of transactions.   
 
 
publicly traded, and it is often not possible to obtain reliable data about private acquirers. Nor is it 
possible to simply restrict our analysis to petitions where the acquirer is public and reliable data is 
available, as this would lead to a highly skewed sample. Private acquirers tend to disproportionately 
include financial buyers, such as private equity firms, where there are unlikely to be large synergistic 
values. As a result, excluding non-public acquirers would skew our sample toward strategic mergers 
with potentially large synergies. Because synergistic values are excluded from the calculation of fair 
value, such transactions are likely to pose abnormally high risk to would-be appraisal petitioners. See, 
e.g., In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 74 (Del. Ch. 2013) (noting that in appraisal, 
valuations must “back out any synergies”); Gearreald v. Just Care, Inc., 2012 WL 1569818, *3 (Del. 
Ch. 2012) (“Determining the value of a ‘going concern’ requires the Court to exclude and synergistic 
value. . . .”); Union Ill. 1995 Inv. Ltd. P’ship v. Union Fin. Grp., Ltd., 847 A.2d 340, 356 (Del. Ch. 
2004) (“[T]his court must endeavor to exclude from any appraisal award the amount of any value that 
the selling company’s shareholders would receive because a buyer intends to operate the subject 
company, not as a stand-alone going concern, but as a part of a larger enterprise, from which 
synergistic gains can be extracted.”). 
 Transaction size thus acts as a proxy for acquirer size. While a large firm can acquire a small firm, 
a small firm will generally not acquire a large firm. We therefore expect that transaction size will be 
strongly correlated with acquirer size. To test this intuition, we examined the transactions for which 
the size of the acquirer was available, and found a positive, statistically significant relationship 
between transaction size and acquirer size. See Korsmo & Myers, supra note 15, at 884. 
 148. While transaction size should not be directly related to the chance of success on the merits—
it is likely to be at least somewhat related to the expected recovery at trial in a fiduciary class action, 
which is related to the “merits,” as we use the term. See supra note 147. Transaction size might be at 
least weakly related to the merits in class actions in that it will be correlated to the size of the class and 
thus the potential damages at trial. In an appraisal claim, however, any relationship should be weaker 
still. Because there is no class in appraisal, the potential damages at trial are limited by the number of 
shares owned by the petitioner, not the size of the transaction. The only potential merit-related 
relationship between transaction size and the incidence of appraisal is that larger transactions may 
have more shareholders with a large enough position to make appraisal worthwhile. See J. Travis 
Laster, The Appraisal Remedy in Third Party Deals, 18 INSIGHTS, Apr. 2004, at 4 (suggesting a 
$500,000 threshold for a worthwhile appraisal claim—$620,000 adjusted for inflation to 2013 dollars). 
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TABLE 3 
COMPARISON OF TRANSACTION SIZE IN APPRAISAL CASES,  
IN MILLIONS OF 2013 DOLLARS 
 
 Equity value Enterprise value 
mean median mean median 
No appraisal $1918.6 $457.8 $2,694.3 $482.7 
All appraisal 2,942.5 381.6 3,042.9 555.7 
 Pro se appraisal 21,086.9 1344.0 20,993.4 1303.7 
Counseled appraisal 1465.6 446.3 1581.8 505.5 
 
Transactions attracting appraisal are larger, on both measures of size, 
than transactions not attracting appraisal.
149
 When we consider only those 
appraisal actions filed by plaintiffs represented by counsel, however, the 
difference in deal size disappears altogether. Indeed, transactions attracting 
counseled appraisal actions are actually smaller than the deals that did not 
generate a counseled appraisal action.
150
  
The focus of our analysis is on the more economically significant 
counseled appraisal petitions, which are far more likely to be sensitive to 
the incentive structure created by legal rules. For counseled petitions, the 
difference in transaction size between deals that attracted appraisal 
petitions and those that did not is not statistically significant, measured 
either in constant dollars or in the logarithm of constant dollars. This lack 
of a strong relationship between transaction size and counseled appraisal 
can be seen visually. Figure 7 shows a kernel density plot of transactions 
that attracted counseled appraisal petitions in gray and those transactions 
that did not in black.   
 
 
 149. None of these differences in size are statistically significant at any conventional level.  
 150. The difference in transaction size between transactions with counseled petitions and pro se 
petitions is significant at least at the five-percent level, across both measures of size and also when 
looking at log dollars. We speculate that large deals attract greater publicity, thus coming to the 
attention of small shareholders who may not act as strictly rational economic actors. 
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FIGURE 7 
DENSITY PLOT OF TRANSACTIONS ATTRACTING COUNSELED APPRAISAL 
PETITION (GRAY), BY THE LOGARITHM OF EQUITY SIZE 
 
Figure 7 illustrates that those transactions that attracted counseled 
appraisal petitions are nearly identical in equity value to those that did not. 
A plot using enterprise value rather than equity value looks similar. 
2. The Importance of the Merger Price 
We also examined the merger premium, which we obtained from the 
Thomson One merger database.
151
 The raw size of the merger premium for 
any given deal is, however, not a particularly satisfactory measure of the 
adequacy of the merger consideration (and, thus, the merits of the claim). 
Average merger premia vary widely across industries and across time, 
with average premia being much higher in the hot deal market of 2007, for 
example, than in the cold market of 2009. Furthermore, as we might 
 
 
 151. In a recent paper, Quinn Curtis and John Morley exploit a similar feature of mutual fund 
excessive fee litigation to evaluate whether the merits matter in such cases. In such cases, the only 
issue is the appropriateness of the funds’ fees, which are directly observable and comparable. See 
Curtis & Morley, supra note 138. They find that the strongest predictor of whether a mutual fund 
would be targeted by such a claim was not the size of the fees charged, but rather the size of the assets 
under management by the targeted fund’s family. They suggest that this may indicate that such 
litigation is triggered less by a meritorious claim, and more by the presence of deep pockets. See id.  
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expect, larger deals tend to involve smaller premia as measured in 
percentage terms.  
In order to take these factors into account, we computed an “expected” 
merger premium based on the most salient variables: the size of the target 
company,
152
 the year of the transaction, and the target company’s industry. 
We then use the residual premium—the difference between the expected 
premium and the actual premium—as our proxy for the merits of the 
underlying legal claim.
153
 The size of the residual premium should be 
negatively correlated with the merits of a claim: a positive residual 
premium implies a weaker claim, while a large negative residual premium 
ought to suggest a stronger claim, all else being equal.  
We computed residual premia based on three measures of actual 
premium: the one-day premium, the one-week premium, and the four-
week premium. We were able to determine these figures for 88 deals that 
attracted appraisal actions—6 pro se and 82 counseled—and 1014 deals 
that did not. Across all three measures, we find that the deals that attracted 
appraisal actions have lower residual premia, as shown in Table 4.  
TABLE 4 
COMPARISON OF MERGER PREMIA RESIDUALS IN APPRAISAL CASES 
 1-day premium 1-week premium 4-week premium 
mean median mean median mean median 
No appraisal 2.1% -3.2% 2.8% -2.9% 2.9% -2.9% 
All appraisal -15.0% -16.0 -15.7 -12.7 -18.4 -20.6 
Pro se appraisal -9.5 -2.0 -11.9 -0.3 -12.1 -3.0 
Counseled appraisal -15.4 -16.1 -16.0 -14.0 -18.9 -21.3 
The appraisal petitions target deals with highly negative residual 
premia, and the differences in residual premia between transactions with 
appraisal and those without are all statistically significant beyond the 1% 
level. A kernel density plot showing the likelihood of attracting counseled 
 
 
 152. In order to avoid circularity, we use the market value of the target company four weeks prior 
to the merger announcement as the measure of the target’s size. By using this measure, we avoid the 
problem of having the target company’s market value being distorted by the proposed terms of the 
merger. 
 153. The procedure used here is similar to that employed by Morley and Curtis in their analysis of 
excessive fee litigation targeting mutual funds. See Morley & Curtis, supra note 138. Rather than 
simply using the raw size of the fee charged by the relevant mutual fund as their measure of merit for 
excessive fee litigation, they first calculate an average fee for funds with a similar investment style, 
and then subtract that average from the individual fund’s actual fee. The result is what they call the 
“Style-Demeaned Expense Ratio.” See id. at 20. 
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appraisal petitions by the four-week residual premium dramatically 
illustrates the difference.
 
 
FIGURE 8 
TRANSACTION PREMIA RESIDUALS FOR TRANSACTIONS WITH COUNSELED 
APPRAISAL (GRAY), BY FOUR-WEEK RESIDUAL PREMIA 
 
The gray line plots the residual premia for transactions that attracted a 
counseled appraisal petition, while the black line shows the same for 
transactions not attracting counseled petitions. The consistent pattern 
across the three measures is that appraisal litigation involves transactions 
with strongly negative residual premia.  
As hypothesized, appraisal petitioners appear to target transactions 
with, all else equal, lower merger premia. While we lack an exogenous 
shock that would allow us to draw more firm causal inferences, the result 
certainly suggests that appraisal petitions are being brought with due 
regard to the merits. Furthermore, counseled appraisal petitioners do not 
appear to simply target large transactions, suggesting they are not merely 
looking for deep pockets and nuisance-value settlements.  
We use two other methods of examining more searchingly the 
empirical determinants of appraisal proceedings. The first is to construct a 
logistic regression model, identifying the factors that predict whether or 
not a transaction will face an appraisal petition. Our dependent variable is 
a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the transaction faced a counselled 
appraisal petition and 0 otherwise. Our transaction dataset again includes 
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93 transactions that attracted at least one appraisal petition, 86 of which 
were counseled. We use as independent variables the log of transaction 
value, the residual premium, and variables for going private transactions 
and financial buyers. Our results appear in Panel A in the Appendix. 
Under all specifications, our measures of deal premium residual are 
strongly significant, and the sign of the coefficient is always negative, 
meaning that appraisal petitioners are more likely to target deals with 
lower merger premia. In addition, the going private variable is positive and 
strongly significant in all specifications, suggesting appraisal petitioners 
target going private transactions, where conflicts of interest are most likely 
to be acute. We estimate the effects of these variables on the incidence of 
appraisal litigation. A one standard deviation decrease in the one-week 
residual premium implies an increase of between 3.3% and 8.8% in the 
predicted probability of an appraisal petition. Similarly, a going-private 
transaction implies an increase in the likelihood of a petition of between 
2.2% and 14.3%. All of the other variables—including, notably, 
transaction size—have no impact on the likelihood of an appraisal petition 
that is statistically distinguishable from zero.  
Our second empirical approach goes beyond treating appraisal as a 
binary yes-or-no question. Instead, we analyze how many shares actually 
sought appraisal. For each transaction, we computed the percentage of 
equity value that sought appraisal, rounding to the nearest percentage 
integer. Of the 1168 appraisal eligible transactions, 48 had 1% or more of 
shareholders seek appraisal. The firms in each transaction that sought 
appraisal are shown in the following table:  
Percentage of shareholders seeking appraisal, by transactions 
Percentage of shareholders seeking appraisal  
(rounded to nearest integer) 
Firms 
0 1120 
1 20 
2 4 
3 6 
4 2 
5 4 
6 2 
7 1 
8 3 
9 1 
11 1 
12 1 
15 1 
17 1 
31 1 
Total 1168 
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We used these numbers as our dependent variables for a poisson 
regression, using the same independent variables noted above. The results 
of this regression appear in Panel B of the Appendix. As in our logistic 
regressions, the sign of the coefficient here for premium is negative under 
all specifications, and in each case it is statistically significant at the 1% 
level. Transaction size is statistically significant only under some 
specifications, and only when equity value is the measure of transaction 
size. While this suggests some role for transaction size, it appears to be a 
small one. A one standard deviation reduction in the one-day premium 
residual, for example, has an effect ten times as strong on the percentage 
of shares seeking appraisal as a one standard deviation increase in equity 
value. In sum, not only was an appraisal petition more likely to be filed as 
the residual premium decreased, but the percentage of shares seeking 
appraisal also tended to go up as the residual premium became more 
negative. By contrast, the incidence of appraisal was not predicted by the 
size of the transaction, and the intensity was only weakly affected.  
As we demonstrate above, however, appraisal activity has increased 
dramatically in recent years. A natural question, then, is whether the 
metrics of litigation merit also changed dramatically as appraisal became 
more widespread in recent years. To test this possibility, we performed 
separate analyses restricted to the approximately 300 transactions that 
closed from 2011 through 2013, and found that our results did not change. 
All of the measures of residual premium still have a negative and 
statistically significant relationship on the incidence of appraisal: it is still 
the case that if the premium is lower, appraisal is more likely. Similarly, 
appraisal is still more likely in the presence of a going-private transaction.  
Taken together, these results suggest that the merits do tend to matter 
in appraisal litigation, and that the rise of litigation arbitrage has not 
changed this picture. This stands in contrast to the fiduciary class action 
litigation involving the same universe of appraisal-eligible mergers. In 
another paper, we show that for fiduciary class actions, deal size is the 
strongest predictor of litigation, with far greater predictive power than the 
size of the merger premium.
154
 While these results do not prove that 
appraisal arbitrage is a positive development, it does at least suggest that 
appraisal is not simply a new frontier of nuisance litigation. The policy 
implications of these findings are developed in the next two Parts.   
 
 
 154. See Korsmo & Myers, supra note 15. 
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IV. THE SOCIAL UTILITY OF THE APPRAISAL REMEDY AND APPRAISAL 
ARBITRAGE 
Given the sharp increase in appraisal litigation and the rise of appraisal 
arbitrage, it is heartening to see that the merits matter in the decision to 
bring an appraisal petition and that petitioners are targeting deals where 
there is reason to think the merger consideration is inadequate. This 
suggests that appraisal is working, at least in some respects, in a socially 
useful way. At the very least, our findings allay the fear that—as one 
commentator has colorfully put it—appraisal will simply become “a back-
end cesspool for strike suits.”155 Nonetheless, appraisal defendants have 
attempted to paint the new brand of appraisal arbitrage as an ominous and 
unwelcome “abuse” that courts and policymakers should frown upon.156 
Thus, it is worth considering more broadly the social utility of the 
appraisal arbitrage.  
The potentially positive role for appraisal is relatively straightforward. 
Just as the market for corporate control can serve as a check on agency 
costs from managerial shirking,
157
 appraisal rights can serve as a back-end 
check on abuses by corporate managers, controlling shareholders, or other 
insiders in merger transactions.  
The idea of a market for corporate control as a governance mechanism 
is well-known.
158
 If a firm’s managers shirk or otherwise mismanage the 
firm badly enough, the firm’s stock will go down in price. If the price falls 
enough, outside arbitrageurs can buy a controlling stake in the firm at the 
depressed price, replace the old management with competent new 
managers, and profit from the subsequent increase in stock price. 
Appreciating the risk that they could be ousted in such a fashion, managers 
have an incentive to avoid shirking in the first place. The substantial 
transaction costs involved in a takeover often render it a governance 
 
 
 155. Geis, supra note 34, at 1664. 
 156. See supra note 24. 
 157. See JONATHAN R. MACEY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: PROMISES KEPT, PROMISES BROKEN 
73–75 (2008). 
 158. See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
CORPORATE LAW 112 (1996); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a 
Target’s Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1173–74 (1981); 
Gregg A. Jarrell, James A. Brickley & Jeffry M. Netter, The Market for Corporate Control: The 
Empirical Evidence Since 1980, 2 J. ECON. PERSP. 49, 51 (1988); Michael C. Jensen & Richard S. 
Ruback, The Market for Corporate Control: The Scientific Evidence, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 5, 29–31 
(1983); Jonathan R. Macey, Auction Theory, MBOs and Property Rights in Corporate Assets, 25 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 85, 96–98 (1990); Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate 
Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110, 112–13 (1965). 
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mechanism of last resort, but the possibility nonetheless serves as an 
important market check on managerial abuse and neglect. 
Similarly, a robust market for appraisal arbitrage could serve as an 
effective back-end market check on expropriation from minority 
shareholders in merger transactions. When a merger takes place at a fair 
price, appraisal arbitrage will not be attractive to outside investors on the 
merits. If, however, a merger is agreed to at a price far enough below fair 
value—measured in conventional financial terms—appraisal arbitrageurs 
will have an incentive to accumulate a position and seek appraisal. In so 
doing, the arbitrageur will serve as a check on low-ball merger agreements 
and freeze-outs.
159
 
Protecting minority shareholders is good not only for minority 
shareholders, but also—in the long run—for controlling shareholders, 
entrepreneurs, and the economy at large. To the extent that minority 
shareholders are protected against mistreatment, they will be willing to 
pay more for their shares in the first place. A governance mechanism that 
reduces the risk of expropriation faced by minority shareholders will thus 
reduce the cost of accessing equity capital for companies and increase the 
allocative efficiency of capital markets as a whole.
160
 
Crucially, however, for appraisal to act as an effective back-end check 
on low mergers, a deep and active appraisal arbitrage market is necessary. 
In the absence of robust appraisal arbitrage, collective action and free-
riding problems would likely render the threat of appraisal proceedings an 
ineffective deterrent to wrongdoing. By buying up large positions after the 
announcement of a transaction, thus allowing them to spread the fixed 
costs of bringing an appraisal claim over a broad share base, arbitrageurs 
can bring meritorious claims that would otherwise be cost-prohibitive for 
dispersed minority shareholders. Arbitrageurs can also bring their 
expertise as repeat players to bear to further reduce the frictions that might 
otherwise prevent appraisal from being an effective governance 
mechanism. Appraisal arbitrage thus solves the same collective action 
 
 
 159. Geis, supra note 34, at 1662 (“[J]ust like the traditional market for corporate control dampens 
the shareholder-manager agency cost problem, a robust back-end market for appraisal rights might 
protect against the majority shareholder expropriation problem.”).  
 160. See generally Daniel R. Fischel, The Appraisal Remedy in Corporate Law, 1983 AM. B. 
FOUND. RES. J. 875, 880; Ralph K. Winter, State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the 
Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL. STUD. 251 (1977). See also Geis, supra note 34, at 1657 (“[A]n overly 
permissive freezeout regime will theoretically reduce the market value of firms that have controlling 
shareholders. Potential investors are haunted by the constant fear of an abusive freezeout. That risk 
should, in turn, depress the upfront price that investors are willing to pay for stock.”) (footnote 
omitted). 
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problems that aggregate litigation seeks to solve, but without generating a 
serious agency problem in the process. 
Potential criticisms of appraisal arbitrage, while superficially plausible, 
are either inconsistent with the empirical evidence or otherwise fail to 
withstand scrutiny. The most basic fear, of course, is that appraisal 
arbitrage will—like other forms of shareholder litigation—turn into a 
swamp of nuisance litigation, with the possible twist that the main 
beneficiaries are opportunistic financiers rather than opportunistic 
attorneys. So far, at least,
161
 the empirical evidence provides no support for 
this fear.
162
  
A related but somewhat more sophisticated concern is that acquirers 
will come to view the risk of appraisal as essentially a tax that raises the 
costs of acquiring a company, and reduce the amount they are willing to 
bid for the company accordingly. As a result, minority shareholders who 
do not seek appraisal would receive less than they would have in a world 
with no appraisal. The net result would be a kind of price discrimination: 
unsophisticated or unmotivated shareholders would receive the lower deal 
price, while sophisticated and motivated shareholders who seek appraisal 
would receive a somewhat higher price. In such a world, society as a 
whole would come out worse, net of transaction costs.
163
  
This argument neglects two important considerations, however. First, 
acquirers have it in their power to render the expected cost of any 
“appraisal tax” negligible. As an initial matter, if they simply price the 
deal fairly, such that the cost of pursuing appraisal is unlikely to be 
justified by the potential recovery at trial, acquirers will face only nuisance 
suits, which—as explained above164—appear to be unlikely. Acquirers 
also can protect themselves contractually by including in the merger 
agreement a provision allowing them to terminate the agreement if more 
than a certain number of shares demand appraisal.
165
  
Second, and perhaps more relevant, any substantial price 
discrimination effect can only persist in the absence of a developed 
appraisal arbitrage market. In a developed appraisal market, appraisal 
arbitrageurs will seek to accumulate a position in the target company 
following the announcement of a transaction, and will continue to 
 
 
 161. We expect to continue to collect data on appraisal litigation, and update our analysis 
annually. 
 162. See supra Part III.B. 
 163. A version of this argument was made by Mahoney and Weinstein in the 1990s. See Mahoney 
& Weinstein, supra note 5, at 242. 
 164. See supra text accompanying notes 125–36. 
 165. See id. at 242. 
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purchase shares until the market price has been driven to the risk-adjusted 
expected present value of an appraisal claim. Indeed, the threat of this 
phenomenon could operate as an ex ante price floor in merger 
negotiations.  
Minority shareholders would thus share in the expected gains from 
appraisal without having to file a petition themselves,
166
 just as the 
benefits from the market for corporate control accrue to ordinary 
shareholders. Indeed, minority shareholders could be better off by sharing 
in these gains than if they had sought appraisal themselves because 
professional arbitrageurs, as sophisticated repeat players, may be able to 
reduce overall costs in pressing claims or achieve better results in 
appraisal than individual investors could on their own.  
Another criticism that might be made of appraisal is that the remedy is 
ultimately circular.
167
 If the merger price is “low” in a transaction, then the 
acquirer is capturing excess value and the target is leaving value on the 
table. Although this phenomenon may sound worrisome at first, 
shareholders who are diversified across potential acquirers and potential 
targets would not actually end up harmed by it. A diversified stockholder 
could expect to profit as much as she suffers from any mispricing of 
mergers—sometimes suffering from a lowball merger price on the target 
side, and sometimes gaining a windfall on the acquirer side. As such, any 
attempt to reallocate the merger proceeds would just shift value from her 
left hand to her right, minus the costs of the proceeding itself. The costs of 
such a system would thus function as pure deadweight loss.  
The basic fault with this argument is that it wrongly assumes that a 
public investor could achieve a portfolio that is sufficiently exposed to the 
acquirers of public companies. In our data set, one-third of the transactions 
involved an acquirer that was a private entity—a private equity fund, a 
dedicated investment vehicle, or a closely-held corporation. When public 
companies are sold to these entities at a discount, the value is captured 
entirely by the private entity and completely lost to public stockholders. 
Because they cannot generally invest in these types of vehicles, public 
stockholders thus cannot diversify away the risk of mispricing in mergers. 
 
 
 166. In several of the cases involving repeat petitioners, we observed substantial trading above the 
merger price following the announcement of the deal. It is possible that this trading represented more 
traditional merger arbitrageurs speculating on the possibility of a topping bid, but it is also possible 
that this represented appraisal arbitrageurs bidding up the price of shares and in so doing paying 
existing minority shareholders a portion of the expected gain. 
 167. See Amanda M. Rose & Richard Squire, Intraportfolio Litigation, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1679 
(2011) (on circularity in the context of securities and corporate litigation). 
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Thus, the circularity argument—potent for other forms of shareholder 
litigation—does not apply to appraisal.  
The most fundamental objection to appraisal is that the courts simply 
are not equipped to perform accurate valuations.
168
 On this view, it is 
unrealistic to expect legal proceedings to do a better job than competitive 
markets at valuing companies. Allowing courts to declare the fair value of 
a company where there has been no showing of any process-based 
wrongdoing apparently flies in the face of the usual strong presumption—
in Delaware, at least—that competitive markets are the best arbiters of 
economic value. The valuations that courts derive in appraisal proceedings 
have, on occasion, attracted ridicule from practitioners and academic 
observers. Courts have sometimes awarded three or more times the merger 
consideration to dissenting shareholders,
169
 leading commentators to decry 
the “casino-like aspect of the appraisal process”170 and lament that courts’ 
“misunderstandings have led to windfalls for dissenting shareholders.”171 
There has been little systematic examination, however, of what courts 
have done in appraisal cases, even in reported opinions.
172
  
To get a sense of what a shareholder might reasonably expect in 
appraisal, we analyzed data on all appraisal opinions between the 
watershed case of Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.,
173
 and roughly the beginning 
 
 
 168.  On occasion, the judges of the Delaware Chancery Court have themselves expressed 
frustration with their role. See, e.g., In re Appraisal of Ancestry.com, Inc., C.A. No. 8173-VCG, 
memo. Op. at *1 (Del. Ch. Jan. 30, 2015) (“I have commented elsewhere on the difficulties, if not 
outright incongruities, of a law-trained judge determining fair value of a company in light of an 
auction sale, aided by experts offering wildly different opinions on value.”); Huff Fund Inv. P’ship v. 
CKx, Inc., 2013 WL 5878807, at *1 (Del. Ch. Nov. 1, 2013). 
 169. See, e.g., Borruso v. Communications Telesystems International, 753 A.2d 451 (Del. Ch. 
1999) (awarding a 3027% premium to a dissenting stockholder of a private company).  
 170. James C. Morphy, Doing Away With Appraisal in Public Deals, 26 DEL. LAW. 30 (2008). See 
also Michael P. Dooley, Rules, Standards, and the Model Business Corporation Act, 74 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 45, 53 (2011) (noting that appraisal awards are sometimes “two to three times the 
merger consideration, thereby turning appraisal into something of a lottery”) (footnote omitted). 
 171. William J. Carney & Mark Heimendinger, Appraising the Nonexistent: The Delaware 
Courts’ Struggle with Control Premiums, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 845, 847 (2003).  
 172. Compare Feng Chen, Kenton K. Yee & Yong Keun Yoo, Robustness of Judicial Decisions to 
Valuation-Method Innovation: An Exploratory Empirical Study, 37 J. BUS. FIN. & ACCT. 1094 (2010) 
(purporting to examine appraisal cases but in fact mixes all sorts of judicial valuations beyond 
appraisal), with Laster, supra note 133, at 29 (suggesting around 400% average return for appraisal 
petitioners, which is consistent with our findings).  
 173. 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983). Prior to Weinberger, Delaware courts—pursuant to statute—used 
the so-called “Delaware Block Method” to value shares in an appraisal. Id. The Delaware Block 
Method entirely eschewed forward-looking evaluations, focusing on trailing indicators like capitalized 
trailing earnings, book value, and liquidation value of assets. See Piemonte v. New Boston Garden 
Corp., 387 N.E. 2d 1145, 1148 (Mass. 1979) (detailing Delaware Block Method of valuation). In its 
refusal to consider forward-looking projections, the Delaware Block Method came to be seen as out of 
step with modern financial theory, and in the seminal 1983 decision in Weinberger v. UOP, the 
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of our data set described above, during which time there were 44 reported 
appraisal opinions in Delaware.
174
 Across 40 opinions that disclose both 
(1) the merger consideration and (2) the final premium awarded in the 
appraisal proceedings, the median award is a 50.2% premium over the 
merger price. The mean award is 330% over the merger price, but this 
statistic is heavily skewed by three very large awards of over 30 times the 
merger consideration.
175
 The range from the 25th to the 75th percentile 
was 8.0% to 149% premium over the merger consideration. Thus, judges 
did not hesitate to award petitioners amounts in appraisal that were well 
beyond the merger consideration. Of course, these cases are over ten years 
old and involve mostly non-public companies, so they should be 
interpreted with caution. One might question why, in many of these cases, 
if these companies were truly as valuable as the courts found, a higher 
bidder did not materialize.  
We are not insensitive to this criticism, but there are reasons to think it 
misses the mark. First, as an empirical matter, if courts were habitually 
over-valuing shares in appraisal we would expect the pattern of appraisal 
litigation to more closely resemble that of fiduciary duty class actions, 
with petitions routinely filed without much regard for the merits. This is 
not, in fact, what we observe. Appraisal activity is strongly associated with 
abnormally low deal premia.
 176
  
More fundamentally, a great many merger transactions take place 
without a true “market test” in the form of a competitive auction. 
Formally, the procedure by which a merger is negotiated is not strictly 
relevant in an appraisal proceeding.
177
 In practice, however, many 
appraisal proceedings involve transactions where there is reason to doubt 
the probity of the process. Most obviously, when an existing majority 
shareholder takes a company private or otherwise freezes out the minority 
shareholders, the potential for abusive expropriation is plain. Indeed, we 
found that such going-private transactions were significantly more likely 
 
 
Delaware Supreme Court revitalized the appraisal remedy by allowing the use of forward-looking 
valuation methods. 457 A. 2d 701 (Del. 1983).  
 174. R. FRANKLIN BALOTTI & JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN, Delaware Appraisal Cases—Valuation 
Methods, in THE DELAWARE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS (3d ed. Supp. 
2013) (starting place was Table 9-1). We supplemented the information collected from that treatise 
with information obtained by reviewing court documents, news reports, and SEC filings.  
 175. These very large percentages increases stem from the fact that the original merger 
consideration in these cases was very nearly zero.  
 176. See supra Part III.B. It remains possible that courts routinely undervalue shares in appraisal, 
which is more difficult to disprove. 
 177. See Golden Telecom, Inc. v. Global GTLP, 11 A.3d 214, 217–18 (Del. 2010).  
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to face an appraisal petition.
178
 In addition, we were struck by the number 
of transactions where the merger price was actually below the market price 
prior to the announcement—sometimes substantially below. Of 1168 
appraisal-eligible transactions between 2004 and 2013, 4.5% of them had 
a negotiated merger price that was below the market price one day prior to 
announcement. While it can certainly be the case that a price below the 
market price represents “fair value,”179 it would be at least somewhat 
anomalous to insist that it is never appropriate to second-guess the 
judgment of the deal market, where the deal market has itself second-
guessed the presumably much broader and more liquid stock market.  
That is not to say that criticism of court-performed valuation is never 
valid. Where there has been a genuine market test, in the form of a free 
and fair auction for control of the company, it would be nothing but 
mischief to allow a shareholder to ask a court to second-guess the 
outcome. As we discuss more fully in the next section, it may be desirable 
to allow acquirers “safe harbor” from appraisal where they can show that a 
true market test has taken place.
180
  
Nonetheless, where a market test is lacking, appraisal can serve as a 
valuable check on abusive transactions. If appraisal is to be effective in 
this role, however, rather than a series of one-off windfalls, appraisal 
arbitrage must play a crucial role. As such, it is a phenomenon that should 
be encouraged, rather than smothered in its crib. 
V. POTENTIAL REFORMS 
In this section, we explore two types of potential reforms. First we 
examine a variety of ways to reform appraisal in Delaware, and we adopt 
something of a Hippocratic approach. Appraisal appears to be working 
well now, and our primary goal is to avoid undermining it. Nevertheless, 
some reforms appear appropriate. We tentatively propose expanding 
appraisal to stock transactions while at the same time creating a safe 
harbor for transactions where there has been a genuine market test for 
 
 
 178. Across our entire sample, 165 of our 1,167 (10%) transactions involved a going-private 
transaction. Of the going-private transactions, 15% attracted an appraisal petition, compared to only 
6% of the other transactions. The difference using a chi-square is statistically significant beyond the 
1% level.  
 179. One relatively common scenario where this may be the case is where news of a pending deal 
has reached the market but the deal price is not yet public, and the market overestimates the likely deal 
price.  
 180. See infra Part V.A.  
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control of the firm. The second type of reform we consider is how 
appraisal might serve as a model for other types of stockholder litigation.  
A. Reforming Appraisal in Delaware 
The fact that appraisal appears to be working relatively well suggests 
that radical reforms designed to substantially alter incentives are both 
unnecessary and unlikely to be beneficial. Two potential reforms that have 
occasionally been proposed stand out as particularly misguided. First, 
some have criticized the holding of Transkaryotic, arguing that appraisal 
petitioners should have to show that the actual shares they own were not 
voted in favor of the merger.
181
 At present—given the way the vast 
majority of transactions are cleared by the Depository Trust Company and 
Cede
182—it would generally be impossible for new purchasers to prove 
how the shares they own had been voted. As a result, this proposal would 
make appraisal arbitrage effectively impossible. Indeed, that is generally 
the point of the proposal. Because appraisal arbitrage is actually crucial to 
the effectiveness of appraisal as a governance mechanism, such a “reform” 
is unappealing.  
Second, Professor Geis has recently proposed a reform designed to 
discourage “extortionate” appraisal claims.183 He suggests that appraisal 
petitioners be required as part of the demand process to declare what they 
believe to be the “fair value” of the stock. They must at the same time 
write an embedded put option that would give the acquirer the right to sell 
the petitioners an additional share of stock for each share-seeking 
appraisal. The strike price is the fair value declared by the dissenter, and 
the shares sold under the put would also be part of the appraisal 
proceeding. The proposal is intended to give the dissenter an incentive to 
name an accurate price and is explicitly intended to increase the risk of 
bringing an appraisal proceeding in order to deter nuisance suits.
184
 Geis, 
of course, wrote without a full picture on the merits of appraisal litigation. 
The empirical results presented here reveal that the existing incentives 
facing appraisal petitioners already encourage meritorious claims, thus 
rendering Geis’s proposed changes unnecessary. 
The goal of the proposal is to call the bluff of petitioners who demand 
too much. Respondents, however, already have a basic but formidable 
 
 
 181. See supra Part II.D.  
 182. See Geis, supra note 34, at 1650–52. 
 183. See id. at 1670–76. 
 184. Id. at 1676. 
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mechanism for doing so: refusing to settle and taking the case to trial. 
With a real petitioner facing the prospect of real litigation costs, 
proceeding to trial, while not without cost, is a comparatively direct way 
for respondents to battle nuisance claims.  
Even on its own terms, however, the proposal is misguided. The 
appraisal petitioner operates at an informational disadvantage. Under 
current practice, a petitioner does not declare their estimate of the “fair 
value” until their pre-trial brief, after the benefit of discovery: reviewing 
documents, receiving interrogatories, and deposing relevant parties. Most 
fundamentally, it does not genuinely improve the incentive structure of 
appraisal. Merger transactions already involve one party—the acquirer—
writing an implied put that gives the other party—the shareholder—the 
right to either exercise the put or go into appraisal. Geis’s proposal simply 
switches the burden to the shareholder to name an accurate price at his 
peril, as an (unnecessary) measure for deterring strike suits, and even 
though the shareholder is almost certainly operating at a significant 
informational disadvantage. Appraisal, under this framework, might 
become so unpalatable as to be rendered a nullity. 
This is not to say that Delaware’s appraisal statute is a flawless gem in 
no need of polishing. But given that appraisal appears to be working 
relatively well, we believe that any changes should be approached with a 
measure of caution and should be aimed at refining appraisal rather than 
limiting it. We tentatively offer two suggestions for improvement, one of 
which would broaden the availability of appraisal somewhat and the other 
of which would limit it. First, the so-called “market-out” exception in the 
current statute makes no sense.
185
 The usual rationale for the exception is 
that appraisal is unnecessary where shareholders have the option of simply 
selling their shares on the open market for what is presumably fair 
value.
186
 The obvious problem with this rationale is that it envisions 
 
 
 185. See supra note 38, at 12. 
 186. See, e.g., Jeff Goetz, A Dissent Dampened by Timing: How the Stock Market Exception 
Systematically Deprives Public Shareholders of Fair Value, 15 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 771, 
787–88 (2010) (“[P]roponents argue, as Professor Manning did, that the market adequately values 
stock; valuation through appraisal is unnecessary because dissenting shareholders can sell their shares 
on the market for the appropriate price.”) (internal citations omitted); David J. Ratway, Delaware’s 
Stock Market Exception to Appraisal Rights: Dissenting Minority Stockholders of Warner 
Communications, Inc. are “Market-Out” of Luck, 28 U. TOL. L. REV. 179, 205 (1996) (“Proponents of 
the ‘market-out’ exception claim that with a publicly-traded stock, the stock market price is an 
accurate and fair valuation of the stock. Therefore, expensive judicial determination of the fair value 
would be redundant.”); Michael R. Schwenk, Valuation Problems in the Appraisal Remedy, 16 
CARDOZO L. REV. 649, 681–82 (1994) (“If the shareholder can receive the fair value of his or her 
stock by selling it in the market, then there is no need for a judicial proceeding to determine this value. 
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minority shareholders selling their shares once the transaction has been 
announced, by which time the horse has already left the barn. Once 
dissenters can sell their shares, the fact of the merger—potentially at an 
unfair price—has already been incorporated into the market price.187 
Perhaps aware of this difficulty, Delaware has crafted an exception to 
the market-out exception for when the shareholders receive as merger 
consideration anything other than shares in the surviving corporation or 
shares in another widely traded corporation.
188
 Thus, public company 
appraisal in Delaware is largely limited to situations where shareholders 
are required to take cash as some portion of the merger consideration. This 
“exception to the exception,” however, does little to solve the problem. 
Just because the stockholder ends up with marketable securities at the end 
of the day does not mean he is able to receive fair value for his original 
shares.  
To take an extreme example, consider stockholders of Company A, 
whose stock is trading at $100 per share. Suppose the board of Company 
A agrees to merge with some acquirer, and under the merger each 
Company A stockholder will receive one share of Company B stock for 
each Company A share. Suppose further that Company B stock is trading 
for $50 per share. A minority shareholder in Company A would be left 
with shares in Company B, worth only half of what his original shares 
were worth, but he would be unable to pursue appraisal as the statute is 
currently constituted. The fact that the consideration the shareholder 
received was in the form of liquid securities would be of little consolation; 
cash is liquid, too. 
Because the adequacy of the consideration paid in a merger does not, at 
the end of the day, depend on the form of that consideration, neither 
should the availability of the appraisal remedy. Thus, the first reform we 
suggest is that the form of merger consideration should be irrelevant to 
eligibility for appraisal. Indeed, for similar reasons we also suggest that 
the sale of all assets ought to trigger appraisal rights that can be exercised 
against the purchaser of the assets, as under the MBCA.  
 
 
It has already been set with the best source of information regarding values: a competitive market.”); 
Wertheimer, supra note 31, at 633. 
 187. See Goetz, supra note 186, at 794 (“[S]ince most shareholders that might wish to dissent 
from the transaction learn about the transaction when the rest of the market does—at the time of the 
public announcement, they can only sell their shares after that announcement. . . . Consequently, 
dissenting shareholders will only be able to sell their interests in the company after the merger’s value 
has become incorporated into the company’s share price.”) (footnote omitted). 
 188. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (b)(2) (2015). 
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Our second proposed reform is to allow acquirers a safe harbor from 
appraisal claims where they can demonstrate that the merger price was 
subjected to a genuine market test. As we noted above, where a free and 
fair auction has taken place, it makes little sense to allow a law-trained 
chancellor—even the experts on the Delaware Court of Chancery—to 
second-guess the price set by the market. In a recent opinion in an 
appraisal case,
189
 Vice Chancellor Glasscock drew an analogy to 
reviewing a real estate transaction that had been conducted at arm’s length. 
He suggested that “[a] law-trained judge . . . would have no reason to 
second-guess the market price absent demonstration of self-dealing or a 
flawed sales process.”190 After observing that he was “faced with a similar 
situation in this much more complex venue of the sale of a corporate 
enterprise,” he lamented that the “statute and interpreting case law direct 
that I not rely presumptively on the price achieved by exposing the 
company to the market.”191  
Vice Chancellor Glasscock is right to lament; appraisal makes little 
sense where there has been a true market test. Satisfying one of the various 
Revlon-type tests, however, is not necessarily a market test. We would 
allow acquirers a safe harbor only where such a genuine market test has 
occurred. Perhaps the most obvious way to do so is to require petitioners 
to show that a market test was lacking. There is reason to think this would 
be sub-optimal, however. Making the process and the motivations of the 
parties relevant to the petitioner’s case would potentially expand the scope 
of legitimate discovery demands upon the defendant. This may result in 
precisely the kind of large, asymmetric litigation costs that could fuel 
settlement of nuisance claims.
192
 Turning every appraisal action into a 
mini-Revlon claim is not in anyone’s interests. A better solution would be 
to maintain the formal irrelevance of deal process to the petitioner’s case 
but allow the defendants the option of mooting the claim by demonstrating 
that a true market test had been performed.  
The difficulty is in defining our safe harbor. Borrowing directly from 
any of the doctrines that apply to mergers in the fiduciary context—like 
Revlon or In re MFW—would result in something far too permissive; we 
are not inclined to expand the safe harbor far beyond a genuine auction for 
control of the company. In our view, for example, the power vested in an 
independent board committee or a majority of the minority shareholders to 
 
 
 189. Huff Fund Inv. P’ship v. CKx Inc., C.A. No. 6844-VCG, memo. op. (Del. Ch. Nov. 1, 2013). 
 190. Id. at *2. 
 191. Id. at *2-3. 
 192. See supra Part III.A. 
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“say no” to a transaction would not be sufficient. These mechanisms set 
up, at best, a Hobson’s choice for existing shareholders, and it is precisely 
in these scenarios where appraisal is useful. 
At a minimum, we believe that to qualify for a safe harbor against 
appraisal, the process should have to satisfy the requirements of Section 
5.15 of the American Law Institute’s 1994 Principles of Corporate 
Governance, regarding interested director mergers.
193
 Section 5.15(b) 
would require (1) public disclosure of a proposed transaction; (2) that 
potential competing bidders be provided with relevant information 
concerning the target and given a reasonable opportunity to submit a 
competing bid; and (3) after complying with (1) and (2), a majority of 
disinterested directors and minority shareholders must approve.
194
  
The ALI would allow use of various lock-up provisions, including 
commitments to pay a termination fee to cover bidder expenses.
195
 While 
lock-ups will often be appropriate, and even beneficial to shareholders, we 
would not be inclined to extend the safe harbor this far. Even standard 
lock-up provisions like termination fees and matching rights have the 
potential to harm minority shareholders by discouraging competing 
bidders. We are here addressing only a safe harbor where none before 
existed, not a standard for liability. Thus, we can safely set a very high bar 
for what will constitute a genuine market test. The potential for mischief 
even with common lock-ups is great enough that appraisal will at least 
sometimes be justified. As such, it seems appropriate to offer management 
and potential acquirers a choice. They may use lock-up provisions and 
face a possible appraisal claim, which is, after all, the status quo. Or they 
may forego deal protection and take advantage of the safe harbor. Which 
option is more advantageous will likely be highly context-specific. 
B. Appraisal as a Model for Shareholder Litigation 
Beyond these modest reforms to what already appears to be a well-
functioning appraisal remedy, it is worth asking what aspects of appraisal 
might usefully serve as templates for reforming the profoundly 
dysfunctional system of fiduciary duty class actions. Elsewhere, we have 
 
 
 193. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 5.15 
(1994). 
 194. Id. Incidentally, the ALI suggested that appraisal rights need not arise if these procedures are 
followed. See id. § 7.21 cmt. c(3), at 306 (“Given that § 5.15(b) supplies an adequate market test, there 
is no need to extend a judicial remedy through appraisal when this test is satisfied.”). 
 195. Id. § 5.15 cmt. c(3), at 369. 
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proposed several fairly straightforward reforms.
196
 These range from lead 
plaintiff provisions akin to those found in the PSLRA,
197
 to reforms to 
D&O insurance,
198
 to switching from an opt-out to an opt-in class 
structure.
199
  
We also made some tentative suggestions regarding eliminating the 
contemporaneous ownership requirement from fiduciary duty class 
actions.
200
 In light of our findings above regarding the expansion of 
appraisal arbitrage, it seems appropriate to expand somewhat upon this 
notion. As of now, appraisal is unique among stockholder litigation in its 
opt-in class and lack of any contemporaneous ownership requirement. 
While the structure of standard aggregate stockholder litigation is that a 
small holder can speak on behalf of millions of non-present investors, with 
the risk that the process may be hijacked by plaintiffs’ attorneys, in 
appraisal the petitioner must put his money where his mouth is.  
As currently structured, the universe of potential lead plaintiffs is 
limited to shareholders who happened to own their shares when the 
transaction was announced.
201
 While this universe may include large 
institutional investors with the resources and economic incentives to serve 
as effective monitors on class counsel, they are also likely to be diversified 
investors with little expertise or interest in pursuing litigation.
202
 
Eliminating the contemporaneous ownership requirement in derivative 
 
 
 196. See Korsmo & Myers, supra note 15. 
 197. Id. at 832 n.10; see also 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(2)(B) (2012). 
 198. See Korsmo & Myers, supra note 15, at 891. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. 
 201. See Dieter v. Prime Computer, Inc., 681 A.2d 1068, 1072–73 (Del. Ch. 1996) (holding that 
an after-acquiring stockholder was disqualified from serving as class representative). See also A. 
FRANKLIN BALOTTI & JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN, THE DELAWARE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND BUSINESS 
ORGANIZATIONS § 13.25 (3d ed. 2011) (citing Leighton v. Lewis, 577 A.2d 753 (Del. 1990)) (“[A] 
stockholder who purchases shares of stock after the announcement of the challenged merger should 
not be permitted to maintain a class action challenging the merger since he is not truly a member of the 
class.”). Although precluded from service as lead plaintiff, after-acquiring stockholders are 
nevertheless often eligible to receive any benefits of the class action settlement because settlement 
classes are commonly defined to include transferees. See In re Prodigy Commc’n Corp. S’holders 
Litig., 2002 WL 1767543, at *4 (Del. Ch. July 26, 2002) (“[W]hen a claim is asserted on behalf of a 
class of stockholders challenging the fairness of the terms of a proposed transaction under Delaware 
law, the class will ordinarily consist of those persons who held shares as of the date the transaction was 
announced and their transferees, successors and assigns.”). Due to the extreme rarity of monetary 
recovery, however, inclusion in the recovery class without an ability to influence the litigation is of 
limited practical utility.  
 202. Professors Cox and Thomas find that most institutional investors fail to even file to get their 
share of class action settlements. See James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Leaving Money on the 
Table: Do Institutional Investors Fair to File Claims in Securities Class Actions?, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 
855 (2002). 
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litigation and securities litigation would allow specialized institutional 
investors—such as those we find pursuing appraisal arbitrage—to seek out 
strong legal claims, and seek to accumulate a large position for pursuing 
litigation. In so doing, they would solve the collective action problems that 
otherwise plague shareholder litigation without simultaneously creating a 
serious agency problem, and would further both the deterrence and 
compensation functions of such litigation.  
While this reform may seem radical, it was actually suggested in 2008 
by no less than now-Vice Chancellor J. Travis Laster.
203
 Laster proposed 
that derivative plaintiffs simply be required to “(1) hold stock at the time 
of the lawsuit and (2) not voluntarily divest the stock during the 
lawsuit.”204 He identifies the contemporaneous ownership rule as having 
originally been created to “prevent corporations from manufacturing 
diversity jurisdiction for claims against third parties,”205 a problem that 
“obviously does not afflict the state courts of Delaware, whose jurisdiction 
does not turn on diversity of citizenship.”206 Since that time, however, the 
alleged justification for the rule has morphed into the supposed necessity 
of preventing the alleged “evil” of an individual purchasing shares with 
the purpose of bringing suit.
207
 
As Laster notes, however, the nature of this “evil” is not entirely clear. 
The “evil” is often described, without further analysis, as purchasing stock 
“with litigious motives.”208 But after-purchasers of stock are not 
“strangers” to the dispute as under the old doctrines of champerty or 
maintenance, in that the purchase of shares “necessarily gives the acquirer 
an equitable interest in the underlying corporation.”209 An after-purchaser 
has the same continuing interest in the corporation as any other 
shareholder. As Laster concludes, “[a] plaintiff who can effectively 
vindicate corporate rights should not be prevented from conferring 
 
 
 203. J. Travis Laster, Goodbye to the Contemporaneous Ownership Requirement, 33 DEL. J. 
CORP. L. 673 (2008). 
 204. Id. at 673. 
 205. Id. at 678 (citing Rosenthal v. Burry Biscuit Corp., 60 A.2d 106, 111 n.4 (Del. Ch. 1948)). 
 206. Laster, supra note 203, at 679. 
 207. See id.; Schoon v. Smith, 953 A.2d 196, 203 (Del. 2008) (claiming that the rule was intended 
“solely to prevent what has been considered an evil, namely, the purchasing of shares in order to 
maintain a derivative action designed to attack a transaction which occurred prior to the purchase of 
the stock.”) (footnote omitted); Ala. By-Prods. Corp. v. Cede & Co., 657 A.2d 254, 264 n.12 (Del. 
1995) (describing the policy against suits by “an individual [who] purchases stock in a corporation 
with purely litigious motives.”). 
 208. See, e.g., Ala. By-Prods. Corp., 657 A.2d at 264 n.12; Screiber v. Bryan, 396 A.2d 512, 516 
(Del. Ch. 1978). 
 209. Laster, supra note 203, at 683. 
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benefits” on the corporation or its shareholders “simply because the wrong 
occurred before the plaintiff purchased its shares.”210 
Nor is it plausible to consider the contemporaneous ownership 
requirement as an effective control on meritless strike suits. As we have 
shown elsewhere, the prevalence of meritless merger litigation could 
hardly become worse.
211
 More likely, a professional investor being willing 
to invest a substantial sum in the expectation of bringing suit would 
represent a signal of merit. As Laster noted, “a stockholder purchasing 
shares with ‘litigious motives’ might be expected to have identified a 
relatively strong claim so as to make it worthwhile to expend funds both to 
purchase the shares and to bring the case.”212 Our findings regarding 
appraisal litigation strongly support Laster’s intuition. Far from barring 
claims by after-purchasers, the Delaware courts should presume that such 
plaintiffs will function as the best monitors of a class action, and they 
should view with great suspicion any suit so weak that no investor was 
willing to invest substantial resources in pursuing it. 
CONCLUSION 
Until now, the academic consensus has been that appraisal litigation is 
a peripheral sideshow. This view, which may have been accurate as 
recently as 2009, must now be radically revised. Appraisal litigation is 
undergoing a period of rapid growth, characterized by a new breed of 
sophisticated repeat petitioners. 
Given the well-known pathologies of shareholder litigation, the 
increase in appraisal litigation might be regarded with some degree of 
apprehension. We show, however, that far from representing a new 
frontier in vexatious litigation, appraisal litigation is a unique form of 
shareholder litigation where the merits are highly relevant to the decision 
to bring suit. The structure of appraisal litigation is such that petitioners 
are able to reap the benefits of bringing a meritorious claim and are likely 
to suffer consequences from bringing a non-meritorious claim. Our data 
bear out these theoretical conclusions. 
More importantly, the growth of appraisal promises to bring genuine 
benefits to shareholders in general, both in terms of providing real 
deterrence against management and controlling shareholder opportunism 
and negligence and in terms of providing meaningful compensation where 
 
 
 210. Id. at 684. 
 211. See Korsmo & Myers, supra note 15. 
 212. Laster, supra note 203, at 689. 
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such behavior persists. By purchasing shares after the announcement of an 
opportunistic transaction with the intention of pursuing appraisal, appraisal 
arbitrageurs share the compensation achieved through appraisal even with 
those minority shareholders who do not pursue appraisal themselves.  
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